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Banned
The game we all play and enjoy so much suffers from one shortcoming for the true simulation buff. Games to date have already emphasized German and American operations. Its time to address what I believe should be the subject of the next title in the SILENT HUNTER series, namely....THE BRITISH. 
.As a pointer to this end, I invite you to read a mag article from a U.S. publication (out of print), called "The General" 
. This was an information piece that appeared in an issue, (vol 23 no. 3 ) dealing with new scenarios that covered Brit Operations. The piece contains a lot of nice contrasts to what you are all used to in the German /American operational sphere. I offer this to whet your appetite for what could be Ubi 
soft's next mouthwatering product.....lets face it, apart from the British, theres only the Russians left 
, and I'll drag out the article I had lying around years ago on Russian sub operations.....later though and on with the BRITISH...a worthy topic for our next generation SILENT HUNTER 5......On with the show. 
LONE WOLVES: The British Submarine Service in World War Two.....by Charles Markuss.
"British Submariners deserve much credit for depriving the Axis of transports and warships, and Rommel's chief of staff ( Gen. Fritz Bayerlien*) would complain after his capture, "We should have taken Alexandria and reached the Suez Canal if it had not been for your submarines." ( About 70% of all British successes in the Mediterranean, and in some months 60% or more of Rommel's supplies were lost, largely to submarine attack). British submarines did not just attack transport ships; they helped make the German invasion of Norway very costly for the Kriegsmarine by sinking 21 ships.
Britain began the war with roughly the same submarine strength as the OKM, about 58 boats; the Royal Navy put another 157 into service through the war, losing some 74 to various causes. This represents less than 10% of the German submarine losses, but does not include 8 Dutch, 3 French, 4 Greek, 2 Polish and 1 Norwegian submarines lost while under British command. In exchange for these losses, British subs accounted for 6 enemy Cruisers, 16 Destroyers, 36 Submarines, 112 minor warships and 493 merchantman. Another 38 merchants, a U-boat, a destroyer, a corvette and 3 torpedo boats are known to have been sunk by mines placed by British subs.
By American or German standards,these figures appear unimpressive. But it should be remembered that British submarines were deployed as 'mobile minefields' or 'lone wolves'. Too, the quality of the opposition must be kept in mind. The German and Italian escorts were efficient and deadly; there was no 'happy time' for British subs of the kind enjoyed by their U.S and German counterparts. Very few large, slow, weakly defended convoys came their way. When Rommel began to lose supplies, German influence transformed Italy's poor ASW capabilities; by the end of 1941, the Italians were 'dangerous' 
as one British submarine commander typically understated. Whatever Allied propaganda had said about the Regia Marina*, their escort vessels were not to be underestimated, and sank some of Britain's great submarine crews-Wanklyn's UPHOLDER, Linton's TURBULENT, Tomkinson's URGE among them.
No suprise, then, that Britain's heaviest losses in their submarine arm were in the Mediterranean Theater. Allied subs lasted no longer than 12 months in those waters. Un-be-known to the Brits, the Italians perfected mine-laying in waters up to 600 feet deep,and so laid mines on such a scale that one British flotilla commander stated that, "it is difficult to see how we could have operated our submarines in the Mediterranean at all." At least 21 of 45 subs lost in this area were mined.
The Mediterranean was also the scene for Britain's greatest blunder in submarine deployment, and the fate of the larger classes of submarines-designed for operations in the Pacific- makes depressing reading. Had these boats, with their long range, designed for depths of 500 feet and the ability to reload all bow tubes in 7 minutes, been available in the Pacific to support the few Dutch and American boats thrown against the Japanese convoys in December, much subsequent bloodshed might have been avoided. They were capable of diving in 40 seconds, and could stay far below the maximum Japanese depth charge setting (295 feet). Their commanders, due to intensive peacetime training, could operate as a flotilla to form British "wolf" packs.
Instead, when Italy declared war these boats were sent in to the Mediterranean; like keeping a whale in a garden pond. Their size, relative sluggishness, noisy auxiliary machinery and leaky fuel tanks, were a fatal combination in an area where exactly the opposite features were essential to survival.
Crews exhausted from a lack of shore leave, they were hunted down and sunk one after another. By the end of 1940, 9 of the original 15 committed to the theater had been lost.
Losses and successes were fewer in other areas; about 20% of successes and 36% of the losses were in Northern waters, of the remaining 10% of successes, 4% of losses occurred in the Far East. The German invasion of Norway provided plentiful, if tough,targets. In the North Sea, they'd usually encounter the fast, elusive blockade runners or the thick skinned German warships or Axis subs. If American submariners
specialized in destroyer demolition, British submariners can be regarded as specialists in sinking their own kind, accounting for one French, 15 German, 17 Italian 2 Japaneses and in error- one British submarine.
Patrols into the North sea or in the Mediterranean were shorter than those in Atlantic or in Pacific waters, but not without numerous hazards. Apart from the enemy, the waters in these two regions (North Sea and Mediterranean) are treacherous and shallow. Only 80-90 feet off the low countries, 105feet off the Helgoland Bight, and no deeper than 150feet in the Kattegit. In deeper areas, the varying seasonal salinity off Norway and in the Mediterranean played havoc with the trim of the subs, and would send them very deep, or out of control, or liable to broach and remain stubbornly afloat. In calm weather, the Norway deep is clear enough to betray submarines down to ninety feet and the Med's crystalline waters can display a sub as deep as 100 feet. Most British submarines based in Malta were painted blue to counteract just this fact.
Certain uniquely British features compounded the dangers and handicaps. Most British subs have Periscopes only about 30 feet long, and this forced them much closer to the surface, increasing detection chances. This came about because British designers demanded solid bronze conning towers and periscopes, to minimize magnetic interference with the magnetic compass. So, being weaker than steel, the periscopes had to be shorter and better supported with heavy, distinctive framing. In addition, the commander of a British submarine directed attacks from the control room, rather than the more central position in the Conning Tower (as in German and U.S. subs)
But the true Achilles heal of all standard British subs was their slow surface speed and relatively poor range (the excess weight of all that bronze had to be balanced somehow.) Economy measures also played a part in the designs. After building 3 fast, long ranged but expensive River Class Subs, production was stopped in favor of the slower and cheaper 'T' Class design. The loss of Singapore as the primary Far East base was not for-seen. The even slower U-Class were not designed for wartime service, but for use as trainers and to act as clockwork mice for the escort vessels that trained too. As it was, they became ideal for service in the Mediterranean and North Seas, but remained pitifully slow. Nor was diving depth a strong point for British subs design, largely because the Brits fitted elaborate safety devices that increased weight and weakened the pressure hull. Moreover, Anglo-American insistence on heavy torpedo armament demanded the fitting of a bulbous, and hence weaker pressure hull than German U-boats.
But British designs also had some strong points in their favor. With their distinctive high and narrow casings, they could dive about 10 seconds, faster than most U-boats of comparable design, and roughly twice as fast as subs of most other nationalities. In North Sea and Mediterranean, this became essential for survival. Diving procedures also helped, for in British and German subs, it was the first man down the hatch who pressed the alarm, not the last as in American boats. In effect, the British and German boats began their dives with hatches open, and the mad scramble to get below caused minor injuries. The payoff was a better chance of escape. The little U class boats could dive in 12-15 seconds, the S boats in 20 -25 seconds and T class in under 30 seconds. (by comparison, US GATO class took 50-60 seconds to dive).
Where the British excelled, though, was not in the technical aspect, but the human side- most notably in selection and training of captains and in tactical doctrine. Implicit in this was the recognition that there would be few 'easy' targets to attack, and as a result, the daylight periscope attack was emphasized to the exclusion of all other methods. Although night surface attacks were a war-time feature, no training was given in this method. Training emphasized minimal use of the periscope against fast moving, escorted targets sailing on a zig-zag course, and the uniquely British feature of a built in Gunnery-type range finder avoided the need to judge the distance to the target on the basis of apparent size, (which submariners of all nations tend to overestimate).
No British officer was given command unless he had passed an intensive, exhaustive training course known with good reason as " The Perisher ". No matter how good a candidate was in other respects, he had to excel on this course; the mediocre and those unable to keep rapid mental track of the targets were quickly weeded out. All simulated attacks, first with models, then with training vessels, were critically assessed by instructors who were themselves experienced submariners. The British system contrasts sharply with those adopted by other submarine services (except, most notably, Germany.) The British never make the mistake of trying to mass-produce submarine commanders.
Like their fire control systems, British torpedoes were un-sophisticated , but effective, due largely to the high number of test firings done by trainees before the war. The standard MkVIII "steam" torpedo was capable of only 45 knots, but, had a range of about 10,000 yards (twice that of US and German counterparts). As in the U.S. Navy, TORPEX, (the best explosive available), was used, but the warhead was larger. Much World War Two torpedo data is contradictory, but it appears that the MkVIII warheads were over 500 ( later 660 pounds). Compare the German warheads who were all either 604lbs (the T 5) or 617lbs, whilst the first US torpedoes of the war carried 500 - 507 lbs. Most of the time, detonators worked. Britain had learned about torpedoes running below their set depth in World War I, the hard way, and this aspect of performance was expected. The Admiralty had developed a magnetic trigger warhead as early as 1924 ( which was successfully used at Taranto), but these were issued for Submarines alone and in limited numbers comparatively late in the war. Like its foreign sisters, the British magnetic torpedo was extremely unreliable, and being rarer, never caused the late-scale mischief inflicted on other submarine services. Official orders to ban magnetic detonators were issued in November 1944, the main fault being premature explosion.
Ben Bryant was the only British commander to claim a sinking with a magnetic detonation torpedo, in August 1942.
Using contact exploders, it is not unexpected, then, that no major capital ships were sunk by British torpedoes, though several were damaged. Poor maintenance caused a number of them to run wild or just sink.. During 1942, a torpedo " shortage " forced the use of stocks of the old MkIVs; then 20 years old, and capable of 35knots, once loaded into a tube, they could not have their depth settings altered without removal; long storage made them very unreliable and at least one sub, the legendary UPHOLDER, was issued with warheads so badly swollen that they would not fit into the tube.
But the real weakness of British torpedo technology lay in the fact that the gyroscope settings were limited to 0 or 90 degrees ONLY. The latter angle was found to be unreliable and its use was quickly dropped. British captains tended thereafter to use their torpedoes to fire 'hose-pipe' salvos as opposed to fans; 'hose-pipe' can be likened to a stream of bullets, in line ahead. These salvos were achieved by firing at regular intervals, and in sequence, so a fan could be achieved ( despite the limitations of the gyroscopes), by firing in a turn. This technique was not ideal for close ranges, since the target would be changing course rapidly, in large increments, while the sub moved slowly. The submarine needed four minutes to complete a ninety degree turn. The advantage of the 'hosepipe' lay solely in the fact that it minimized errors in estimating target course and speed, and eliminated the errors common in gyroscopic torpedoes.
Another distinctly British aspect was the enthusiasm for surface gunnery. By comparison, German and U.S. commanders made little use of their guns. In pre-war exercises, the rapid "battle surface" gunnery technique was well rehearsed, especially in the Far East Squadron. Ben Bryant, serving in the North Sea and Mediterranean, estimated that he sank an average of 10 tons of shipping for every 10 pound shell fired from the 3" guns of SEALION and SAFARI. Many later built "S" class and "T" class subs mounted the much more effective 4" gun. As targets decreased in size in the latter stages of the Mediterranean and Pacific campaigns, these guns played an increasing role and targets were attacked in waters as shallow as 20 feet. Indeed, prior to the lifting of restrictions, British submarines were forced to use the gun to stop targets before sinking those that could be justified (torpedo attacks without warning were not allowed until 9 Apr 1940 in the North, and not before July in the Mediterranean).
What of the men themselves? Many of the common seaman and junior officers were pressed into service against their will to replace the heavy losses, and most took to their new job and performed admirably. Captains tended to be very young (22 years the youngest). They were regarded as being at their peak between 25 and 30 years of age, after which, it was thought, they became too cautious. Only one commander served in submarines from the start of the war to the finish (and he was ashore for an extended 8 month leave from sickness). Two of Britain's aces were comparatively old, however. Linton was 37 when he was killed, and Ben Bryant commanded SAFARI until he was 38 years old. By November 1944, most submarine commanders present when the war commenced were gone- either to their graves, to command surface ships (gruffly known to British submariners as "The Grey Funnel Line" * 
), or to staff appointments. ( "Driving a desk"*, or, "acquiring a polished ars@" , in Naval Service parlance* )
(* = notes. Additions to text made by NIMITZ1967)
Such was the British Submarine Service and submariners. I hope you found this piece informative and a nice comparison to our own
operations here in the Pacific.....Thanks to all that post here....Enjoy!
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Banned
NIMITZ1967;
A scholarly and comprehensive piece of work! ......Thank you!! 
klcarroll
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Banned
Thanks mod...haven't figured out how to use half the good stuff on this site.....and what a great and friendly site it is too!....look forward to more of the same....I'm a military history fanatic with a particular interest in this campaign....SILENT HUNTER 4 is the type of simulation where days pass, with neither sustenance nor great standards of personal hygiene, nor even turning up for work when you should. ..this game and website just ROCKS
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Member
i must say "a well wrote & informative post " thanks for posting it 
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Senior Member
Thanks NIM....great stuff
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Member
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Member
Just started reading WAR BENEATH THE SEA Submarine conflict 1939-1945 by Peter Padfield.
He covers the British, American, German, and Japanese Submarines, taking quotes from war diaries from skippers and others like BDu. good reading, and should be able to get it out at the library. Has a lot of what NIMITZ said in his post.
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Banned
Sounds good...you know...the harder you search for a day to day record of exactly where these American submarines were, day by day..each one of them.......anybody that can help me with a title to that end....that would be muchos gracias amigo mucho!
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Banned
Just a little errata......
The 21 ships lost off Norway were not all warships.
British MkVIII torpedo had a 750 pound warhead (later 850). The figures quoted in the article refer to older and rarer types respectively. A more recent victim of a MKVIII was the Argentinian Cruiser, GENERAL BELGRANO- not bad for a torpedo first introduced in 1928! 
The 3" guns mentioned on SEALION and her sisters fired 16 pound shells.
sorry bout that...Enjoy! 
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Member
Excellent stuff. I agree, Ubisoft should have a go at doing the British boats in the Med. Would be lots of fun sinking Rommels supplies and evading the Italians.
