PDA

View Full Version : Some tales and possible effects of fatigue. - True tales.



Waldo.Pepper
08-23-2004, 06:18 PM
From Carrier Pilot by Norman Hanson.

A carrier pilot from who flew from the Illustrious.

Some tales and possible effects of fatigue.

p. 145-146

Don Hadman hit the barrier on landing and the rest of us flew around in circles waiting for the flight-deck party to sort things out. I was on next. I crossed the barriers, folded my wings and taxied on to the forward lift. I had just stopped and switched off when there came the deafening scream of tortured metal behind me. Joe Vickers had drifted off to port on his approach. Probably because Joe had lost sight of the batsman, he ignored all signals from Hastings to go round again; and Johnny had to jump for his life into the safety net as Joe hit the port after group of 4.S-inch guns. He then careered up the port side of the deck until he crashed heavily into the great steel stanchion of No 1 barrier, slewing the tail round to rest across the nets, with the nose pointing towards the island.
Because of amateur, albeit willing, interference in clearing up prangs, Captain Cunliffe had ordained that no goofers should approach a crashed aircraft. All rescue work had to be undertaken only by the flight-deck parties. So we stood our ground, Reggie Shaw and I. 200 feet away. Alan Vickers was still in the cockpit, either unconscious or dead-we shall never know. His head lolled to one side and it may be that his neck had been broken by the impact.
So the men who mattered leapt into action. Fire-fighters in their asbestos suits were running out their hoses to drench the engine in foam. A sick bay chief jumped up on to one wing, Doc Alcock, the flight-deck doctor, on the other. George McHardy-against all the rules, but nevertheless most gallantly-climbed on to the cockpit hood on which he sat astride, trying to help the other two to unharness Vickers and lift him out.
So far all was going well. Then, without a spark of warning and with the concussion of seething hot air, the main petrol tank went up in a great explosion. The chief was killed on the spot. Ron Alcock was flung to the deck, horribly burned on head, face and arms. George was blown-a great torch of bright flame-in a wide arc to the sea, 50 feet below. The aircraft was now an inferno, with firefighters covering the engine in foam and flames leaping high from the fuselage. But even these men had to withdraw when the six guns of the Corsair roared into action and sprayed the island with lead and steel. Burning oil and petrol flowed from the aircraft into the ready-use ammunition locker below where three boys, trapped by the aircraft lying across their only exit, were badly burnt. Then came the final catastrophe. The rear end of the Pratt and Whitney power unit was made of magnesium alloy. Now it, too, caught fire. Nothing could extinguish it, nor could anyone now approach because of the intense heat.
Alan Vickers was dead. The chief was dead. George McHardy, picked up by a destroyer and rushed to hospital in Madras, died there from his dreadful burns. Doc Alcock and three gunners below the flight-deck were transferred to hospital with serious and disfiguring burns.


And moreā... Page 220



The ventilating fans were shut down, causing the inside of the ship to become airless and, as the day wore on, decidedly smelly! Food consisted of bully-beef sandwiches and endless tea-typical action stations rations.
So we were thrown out of our cabins, usually at the last moment--and, if you were unwise enough to snatch those last few precious minutes, unwashed and unshaven. Some chaps, in a fine 'Oh !-Sod-it!' spirit, shunned ablutions-even breakfast-and flew all day in their pyjamas against the Empire of the Rising Sun. Most oifs went along for some sort of breakfast. Those on the early shift, ~o to speak, then made their way to the air operations room, some to remain there on standby, the remainder to grab their helmets and Mae Wests and go out to the flight-deck in the cold of a pre-dawn morning, to climb into their Corsairs and sit and shiver.
In the meantime Colin Cunningham and John Hastings were checking and spotting the aircraft for take-off, most of which duty had been carried out theā· previous evening. At 0600 the first standing patrols took off, followed quickly by the first mixed striking force of the day, the Avengers to bomb the runways on the three islands, the fighters to shoot up any aircraft they could find and stand guard over the bombers.
With the first launch out of the way, more Corsairs were ranged at readiness, to be scrambled immediately should the enemy appear on the radar screens. As soon as the early strike was seen to be returning, Corsairs flew off to continue the patrols over the islands. This was usually a three-hour stint, with the patrols being replaced at regular intervals until darkness fell.
The ship remained at a state of readiness throughout the day, conditioned by three stages of air-raid warnings-Yellow, Blue and Red-which demanded, for the fighters, standby, readiness and scramble in that order. So the day wore on; take-offs and landings at regular intervals, requiring the Fleet to turn into wind on each occasion. And how the destroyers loved this! It provided for them a refreshing change from their faithful zig-zagging and asdic watch which they pursued zealously and endlessly; for suddenly they were required to re-form their screen as quickly as possible, which gave them the chance to show their paces by romping through the Fleet at a rate of knots, with no end of panache and exhibitionism!

(Going to need a pilot skin in long johns for this one).

Waldo.Pepper
08-23-2004, 06:18 PM
From Carrier Pilot by Norman Hanson.

A carrier pilot from who flew from the Illustrious.

Some tales and possible effects of fatigue.

p. 145-146

Don Hadman hit the barrier on landing and the rest of us flew around in circles waiting for the flight-deck party to sort things out. I was on next. I crossed the barriers, folded my wings and taxied on to the forward lift. I had just stopped and switched off when there came the deafening scream of tortured metal behind me. Joe Vickers had drifted off to port on his approach. Probably because Joe had lost sight of the batsman, he ignored all signals from Hastings to go round again; and Johnny had to jump for his life into the safety net as Joe hit the port after group of 4.S-inch guns. He then careered up the port side of the deck until he crashed heavily into the great steel stanchion of No 1 barrier, slewing the tail round to rest across the nets, with the nose pointing towards the island.
Because of amateur, albeit willing, interference in clearing up prangs, Captain Cunliffe had ordained that no goofers should approach a crashed aircraft. All rescue work had to be undertaken only by the flight-deck parties. So we stood our ground, Reggie Shaw and I. 200 feet away. Alan Vickers was still in the cockpit, either unconscious or dead-we shall never know. His head lolled to one side and it may be that his neck had been broken by the impact.
So the men who mattered leapt into action. Fire-fighters in their asbestos suits were running out their hoses to drench the engine in foam. A sick bay chief jumped up on to one wing, Doc Alcock, the flight-deck doctor, on the other. George McHardy-against all the rules, but nevertheless most gallantly-climbed on to the cockpit hood on which he sat astride, trying to help the other two to unharness Vickers and lift him out.
So far all was going well. Then, without a spark of warning and with the concussion of seething hot air, the main petrol tank went up in a great explosion. The chief was killed on the spot. Ron Alcock was flung to the deck, horribly burned on head, face and arms. George was blown-a great torch of bright flame-in a wide arc to the sea, 50 feet below. The aircraft was now an inferno, with firefighters covering the engine in foam and flames leaping high from the fuselage. But even these men had to withdraw when the six guns of the Corsair roared into action and sprayed the island with lead and steel. Burning oil and petrol flowed from the aircraft into the ready-use ammunition locker below where three boys, trapped by the aircraft lying across their only exit, were badly burnt. Then came the final catastrophe. The rear end of the Pratt and Whitney power unit was made of magnesium alloy. Now it, too, caught fire. Nothing could extinguish it, nor could anyone now approach because of the intense heat.
Alan Vickers was dead. The chief was dead. George McHardy, picked up by a destroyer and rushed to hospital in Madras, died there from his dreadful burns. Doc Alcock and three gunners below the flight-deck were transferred to hospital with serious and disfiguring burns.


And moreā... Page 220



The ventilating fans were shut down, causing the inside of the ship to become airless and, as the day wore on, decidedly smelly! Food consisted of bully-beef sandwiches and endless tea-typical action stations rations.
So we were thrown out of our cabins, usually at the last moment--and, if you were unwise enough to snatch those last few precious minutes, unwashed and unshaven. Some chaps, in a fine 'Oh !-Sod-it!' spirit, shunned ablutions-even breakfast-and flew all day in their pyjamas against the Empire of the Rising Sun. Most oifs went along for some sort of breakfast. Those on the early shift, ~o to speak, then made their way to the air operations room, some to remain there on standby, the remainder to grab their helmets and Mae Wests and go out to the flight-deck in the cold of a pre-dawn morning, to climb into their Corsairs and sit and shiver.
In the meantime Colin Cunningham and John Hastings were checking and spotting the aircraft for take-off, most of which duty had been carried out theā· previous evening. At 0600 the first standing patrols took off, followed quickly by the first mixed striking force of the day, the Avengers to bomb the runways on the three islands, the fighters to shoot up any aircraft they could find and stand guard over the bombers.
With the first launch out of the way, more Corsairs were ranged at readiness, to be scrambled immediately should the enemy appear on the radar screens. As soon as the early strike was seen to be returning, Corsairs flew off to continue the patrols over the islands. This was usually a three-hour stint, with the patrols being replaced at regular intervals until darkness fell.
The ship remained at a state of readiness throughout the day, conditioned by three stages of air-raid warnings-Yellow, Blue and Red-which demanded, for the fighters, standby, readiness and scramble in that order. So the day wore on; take-offs and landings at regular intervals, requiring the Fleet to turn into wind on each occasion. And how the destroyers loved this! It provided for them a refreshing change from their faithful zig-zagging and asdic watch which they pursued zealously and endlessly; for suddenly they were required to re-form their screen as quickly as possible, which gave them the chance to show their paces by romping through the Fleet at a rate of knots, with no end of panache and exhibitionism!

(Going to need a pilot skin in long johns for this one).

p1ngu666
08-23-2004, 07:08 PM
thanks for posting, bit of a sad story tho

but in that vid u posted, it had stuff landing with drop tanks...
isnt that a really silly idea, safty wise?

http://www.pingu666.modded.me.uk/mysig3.jpg
<123_GWood_JG123> NO SPAM!

Waldo.Pepper
08-23-2004, 07:46 PM
No they were told to keep the droptanks if at all possible. There is a very good reason when you think about it too.

There is very limited storage space on board ship to keep such 'expendable' itens as drop tanks. So whenever possible they were told to keep them.

If you look at the video really closely and compare it to what a Corsair could carry you you'll notice that in the video they only hung one drop tank as well. They could carry two (I have even seen pictures of three I think too!)

So carrying one tank could be a reflection of

1. Not enough to go around because the ship had too few of them after some time at sea.

or

2. Unwilling to pay the penalty in drap (loss of fuel efficiency) or perhaps unwilling to pay the penalty in performance. (speed or load carrying performance that is.)

Furthermore, according to another source, at least when applied to the USN, proceedure was to use the fuel in the drop tank to conduct the loiter portion of the patrol (once the Corsair had reached the maximum dintance from the carrier.)

This seems counter intuitive, but the wing tanks were used first, as they were not self-sealing.
Better to burn off that fuel first you see.

I think I got all that right, will go check, and correct it if I muffed it up.

Waldo.Pepper
08-23-2004, 10:12 PM
From Alfred Price World War Two Fighter Combat.

Pages 49-50

Extending the Reach

At the beginning of the Second World War the single-engined fighters in service were, without exception, Short-ranging machines able to operate at a high speed cruise within a radius of action of only about 160 miles. By the beginning of 1941, however, simple drop tanks were in use or planned for almost all operational fighter types.

Using fuel from their drop tanks for the initial part of the flight, and by careful fuel handling and cruising at low speeds, fighter pilots were able to operate at quite remarkable distances from their bases. For example the lightweight Japanese A6M2 Zero, powered by a small engine developing a maximum of only 950 horse-power, was able to carry the not exceptional total of 114 Imp (137 U.S.) gallons of fuel internally and 73 Imp (86 U.S.) gallons in a drop tank. By cruising at speeds around 135 mph on lean mixture at low engine revolutions, however, it was possible to reduce consumption of a 'clean' Zero to about 18 Imp (22 U.S.) gallons of fuel per hour. Such flying methods, employed during the early stages of the Pacific war by pilots well practised in their use, enabled Zeroes based on Formosa to escort bombers as far alield as Manila in the Philippines - which represented a radius of action of ahout 500 miles.

Of course, the distance from their base to which fighters are operated depends to a large extent on the risks a commander is prepared to take. The slow-cruising Zeroes in the example quoted above would certainly have had a thin time had they been 'bounced' by enemy fighters while en route. However, the Japanese were more ready than most to take risks with men and equipment in order to secure a military gain, and they did not shrink from planning flights which cut deeply into an aircraft's fuel reserves.

To see how rapidly the various safety factors and allowances could whittle away the combat radius of a fighter, let us examine the U.S. Navy figures for the F4U-1 Corsair carrier fighter. With a full internal fuelload of 300 Imp (361 U.S.) gallons, plus a 145 Imp (175 U.S.) gallon drop tank, this aircraft was credited with a maximum range of 2,215 miles cruising at 178 mph. Terms such as 'maximum range' need to be defined, however, and this was the official U.S. Navy definition:

Maximum range: this is a design yardstick and for this reason it does not include warm-up, take-off or reserve fuel. However it does take account of the horizontal distance travelled and the fuel used during the climb to and the descent from the designated altitude. Ammunition and drop tanks are carried the full distance in calculating the maximum range.

From the above it can be seen that the term 'maximum range' was virtually meaningless in any operational context. Halving this figure and subtracting a little for bad luck would leave one with a very shaky combat radius. In fact, the practical combat radius of the Corsair with this same fuel load was only 425 miles - about one-fifth of the theoretical maximum range. So again it is necessary to define the terms used, and in the U.S. Navy 'practical combat radius' was defined as follows:

Practical combat radius is based on 20 min. warm-up and idling; 1 min. take-off; 10 min. rendezvous at 60% normal sea-level power (NSP) and auto-rich (mixture); climb to 15,000 feet at 60% NSP; cruise-out at 15,000 feet at speed for maximum range and auto-lean; drop external tanks; 20 minutes combat at 15,000 feet at full military power; descent, cruise back at sea level at speed for maximum range and auto-lean; 60 minutes rendezvous, landing and reserve at speed for maximum range on auto-lean. Radius includes distance covered in climb, but not in descent.

The allowance of 20 minutes for warm-up and idling might seem excessive but in terms of carrier operations, when a whole task force might have to turn into wind to allow the aircraft to take off, this was not so. Similarly the 60 minutes reserve to get back, find the carrier and land on was necessary to allow for the vagaries of the wind and the weather; without this fuel in hand a rain squall over the carrier, or a crash blocking the deck, might otherwise result in all or part of an air group having to ditch.

In the case of the F4U-I Corsair, the combat radius was further limited by the amount of protected fuel that was available when it went into combat. Only the main fuselage tank was self-sealing; the wing tanks and drop tank were not. The plan was, therefore, for the Corsair to cruise out to its combat area using first the fuel in the wing tanks, then the fuel out of the drop tank. When it reached its practical combat radius from its carrier the Corsair still had 112 imperial (134 U.S.) gallons remaining in its drop tank, which had to be released if the aircraft was to go into combat immediately; or the fuel could be used for a 2~-hour patrol at the limit of the practical combat radius. So much for the practical radius of action figures for the Corsair; they illustrate well the sort of operational constraints imposed by the need to operate aircraft in wartime without undue hazard. If a commander wished to conduct operations at distances beyond the practical combat radius of his aircraft he could do so, but first he had to ascertain that the weather and other conditions were favourable and the fuel reserves would not be really needed.

same book Page 57.

On the subject or fighter vulnerability, an interesting point to consider is the degree by which this was increased by the carriage of fuel in non-selfsealing drop tanks. Firing trials carried out in the U.S.A. late in the war showed that even in extreme cases, where the drop tanks were hit and blew open, the fuel fell clear downwards and no trailing fire resulted; exploding drop tanks showed no tendency to fragment, rather they split into large pieces which moved outwards at low velocity and caused little secondary damage. Since fire cannot exist without a plentiful supply of oxygen, the flames from a burning tank could not possibly creep up fuel lines and reach other tanks inside the aircraft. The trial showed that in most cases the only effect of the drop tank being hit while in place was that it absorbed a blow which the aircraft would otherwise have had to take. From all of this a general conclusion was reached: it was unnecessary for a lighter pilot to jettison his tanks unless he really needed the extra performance which resulted; even if he was surprised by an enemy and hit in the drop tank, almost invariably the latter could be released before it caused damage. It was an important finding, particularly for those responsible for planning operations from aircraft carriers where storage space for expendable items was always at a premium.

michapma
08-26-2004, 06:16 AM
I love threads like this. http://ubbxforums.ubi.com/images/smiley/16x16_smiley-happy.gif

http://www.baseclass.modulweb.dk/69giap/fileadmin/Image_Archive/badges/69giap_badge_chap.jpg (http://giap.webhop.info)

The ongoing IL-2 User's Guide (http://people.ee.ethz.ch/~chapman/il2guide/) | Forgotten Skies (http://www.forgottenskies.com/)
But we are all that way: when we know a thing we have only scorn for other people who don't happen to know it. - Mark Twain, Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc

stubby
08-27-2004, 01:19 PM
I wonder how online wars will be waged in the Pacific? After reading this, it would seem to immulate a real mission, you would have to be willing to spend a few hours on a single mission and be willing to risk that no contact with the enemy is made. With these drop tanks and internal fuel capacities, I can't imagine even the hard core, full real guys wanting to spending a couple of hours on a single mission. I could be wrong. The Eastern Front with the maps that currently exist I feel strikes almost the perfect balance of getting the feel for flying a mission and meeting the enemy. PTO - I just don't have the desire to flying an hour over empty water and not finding the baddies.

Baco-ECV56
08-27-2004, 01:56 PM
Well I would http://ubbxforums.ubi.com/infopop/emoticons/icon_wink.gif.
The onlly factor I see is that the frustration and anxiety level would soar.

Right now I ussually fly about 2 to 4 missions on line before quiting. So if I do badlly in the foirst ones I have a chance to redim myself. With missions of 2 houres of duration that number would be reduced to 1 or 2 a session.

So doing good and having a sense of acomplishment must happen in mission 1, since you most probablly wonāĀ“t get a second chance http://ubbxforums.ubi.com/infopop/emoticons/icon_wink.gif.

Of course, you can implement a rule in On-line wars so that every plane must take off with 50% fuel to reproduce the 2 houres of flight taken from a real mission.
That way you still need your Drop Tanks, and need to keep them during the fight or risk a low fuel return...

I donāĀ“t see this realistic ranges as a bad thing, since you can always create close battles, and the ones that want and enjoy realistic flight times can have them too http://ubbxforums.ubi.com/infopop/emoticons/icon_wink.gif.