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Skoshi Tiger
11-01-2007, 06:49 AM
I was reading the local news paper today and found a half page spread titled 'The new Battle of Britain'.

It is about some wag of a historian (Andrew *******) that reconds that the Royal Navy saved England from the Germans and that the RAF part in it was 'exaggerated' and that "many pilots were so badly trained that could not shoot straight"

The article describes Britains "primitive" radar system was not as effective as claimed and that it was "subject to exaggerated accounts designed to gain more funding from Chirchills government"

Now I'm not much of a millitary tactician or historian, but I pretty sure that with out close to total air superiority any invasion (in either direction) accross the channel would have been a disaster.

Without the RAF I doubt the Royal Navy could have opperated inside a confined space like the channel without massive losses.

It doesn't take an Einstien to work out that the defense of Britain was a team effort and that without support the RAF recieved (RFD, Observer corps, Home Guard Army, Navy etc) things could have gone a lot worse for Britain.

There was one statement, which I assume to be based on fact, was that only one in seven RAF pilots could claim a kill durring the Battle. It's going to be a bummer if BoB turns out like that!

Skoshi Tiger
11-01-2007, 06:49 AM
I was reading the local news paper today and found a half page spread titled 'The new Battle of Britain'.

It is about some wag of a historian (Andrew *******) that reconds that the Royal Navy saved England from the Germans and that the RAF part in it was 'exaggerated' and that "many pilots were so badly trained that could not shoot straight"

The article describes Britains "primitive" radar system was not as effective as claimed and that it was "subject to exaggerated accounts designed to gain more funding from Chirchills government"

Now I'm not much of a millitary tactician or historian, but I pretty sure that with out close to total air superiority any invasion (in either direction) accross the channel would have been a disaster.

Without the RAF I doubt the Royal Navy could have opperated inside a confined space like the channel without massive losses.

It doesn't take an Einstien to work out that the defense of Britain was a team effort and that without support the RAF recieved (RFD, Observer corps, Home Guard Army, Navy etc) things could have gone a lot worse for Britain.

There was one statement, which I assume to be based on fact, was that only one in seven RAF pilots could claim a kill durring the Battle. It's going to be a bummer if BoB turns out like that!

Kurfurst__
11-01-2007, 06:53 AM
20 pager be sure.

F19_Orheim
11-01-2007, 06:56 AM
Well I have read a few articles about this RAF/Royal Navy debacle, and there was this wise guy who summoned it up pretty well; "It was a nice teamwork"

More ships in BoB Oleg!!! non-AI!

leitmotiv
11-01-2007, 06:59 AM
Same old grenade throwing which has been going on since Roger Parkinson's scholarly treatment of the B of Brit in 1977. If Fighter Command had not mattered, the Luftwaffe would have bombed London to rubble in daylight, as they attempted to do in September. He can atomize the defense net all he wishes, there was nothing like it in the world in 1940. The British pioneered the integrated air defense control network in WWI, and what they had in 1940 was basically what they had in 1918 + radar. The brilliant organization stood the test of time. Of course the Royal Navy was just as important as Fighter Command, and so was Bomber Command. All three prevented London from being Warsaw/Rotterdam-ed or Kent invaded. If one pillar had collapsed, all would have been over.

luftluuver
11-01-2007, 07:00 AM
See this thread http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/23110283/m/7061058206

anarchy52
11-01-2007, 07:06 AM
The major obstacles to German invasion were the lack of suitable landing crafts and the Royal Navy.
Ferrying troops and equipment across the channel in barges?!? Royal navy would suffer heavy casualties operating in the confined space of the channel if Luftwaffe got the upper hand, but invasion "fleet" would be decimated, making the invasion a doomed effort.
Personally, I think operation Sea Lion was a bluff, and the Brits saw it as a bluff as well. I do not think the Germans had any illusions about the chances of a successful invasion either. Both the air campaign and the invasion threat were a form of pressure on the British government to accept the peace.

RAF had a crucial role in fighting the air campaign to a standstill and saving Churchill's position.

I have an interesting "what if scenario":
War stays confined on the channel front, Germans do not attack Soviet Union and in 1942 Stalin puts his plan of invading Europe into action.

What happens next?

Skoshi Tiger
11-01-2007, 07:10 AM
I guess topics like this go around in circles endlessly!

Every few years someone wants to get his name in print, dusts off some old ideas and says "hey everyone look how smart I am!"

History can't speak for it's self if it gets revised too many times!
It's sad were loosing the people who experienced these things first hand and are left with these so called historians.

F19_Orheim
11-01-2007, 07:27 AM
History is interesting indeed. Line of events you can find out quite objectively. Reasons, causes and the big picture behind the line of events are most certainly always subjective.

WOLFMondo
11-01-2007, 07:27 AM
Does it matter? Britain won, Germany lost. Results are what counts here.

csThor
11-01-2007, 07:31 AM
http://common.think-systems.ch/images/zeitbombe.gif

F19_Orheim
11-01-2007, 07:34 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by WOLFMondo:
Does it matter? Britain won, Germany lost. Results are what counts here. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

it might not matter to the outcome - true... but should we only discuss the results of things? Results are often quite easy to fathom, the underlying reasons are what is interesting to debate. There is quite a big difference between mere observation and understanding.

Blood_Splat
11-01-2007, 07:39 AM
I blame Bush! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/16x16_smiley-very-happy.gif

JG6_Oddball
11-01-2007, 07:40 AM
hey wait ...I got a better one...britain lose's germany takes control, invades russia and now 109/spit are fighting side by side....hmmm time to make a COOP


s!

Whirlin_merlin
11-01-2007, 10:15 AM
I see panto seasons come early this year.

All together now 'Oh yes they did! etc.

DKoor
11-01-2007, 10:35 AM
Luv the speech form of one soldier who, in heated conversation with his mate in the trench, was talking about one war leader:

Soldier1:"Did he survived the war?"
Soldier2:"Yes"
Soldier1:"Then he was right and his enemy was wrong"
Soldier2:"fneb"

Pretty much ends the Grand Scheme of Things for me.
Even if such logic is flawed..... further discussions are just un-necessary complications with no reasonable end in sight.

Hatter_RAF
11-01-2007, 11:03 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Skoshi Tiger:
History can't speak for it's self if it gets revised too many times!
It's sad were loosing the people who experienced these things first hand and are left with these so called historians. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Take it from me, the idea that history can speak for itself is complete fiction.

ShaK.
11-01-2007, 11:26 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">RAF didn't win the battle of Britain? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
ofcouse not! everyone knows it was America and our P-51 which won the Battle of Britain

Von_Rat
11-01-2007, 12:22 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by ShaK.:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">RAF didn't win the battle of Britain? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>
ofcouse not! everyone knows it was America and our P-51 which won the Battle of Britain </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

maybe hollywood will make a movie like that.


that should get things rolling. lol.

waffen-79
11-01-2007, 12:55 PM
FACTS

1.Op Sealion was a bluff, doomed if indeed carried away.

2.RAF did win BOB, thanks to Goering, LW intelligence and english RADAR, BE SURE.

3.First priority of the reich was to make britain an ally or at least neutral to the cause, but britain didn't want to be the sidekick of noone as it had an agenda of its own.

Proofs? NO, YOU prove it wrong

leitmotiv
11-01-2007, 01:20 PM
Modern British historians have a ritual. To prove they are free of sentiment, they have to eventually write a book trashing the B of B as a non-event. Parkinson and Overy are two classic examples. It's part of the reductio ad absurdum attitude of the modern British academic class---nothing really matters, human affairs are absurd. Delighting in the stomps of your forefathers is atavistic jingoism.

ImpStarDuece
11-01-2007, 02:22 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by waffen-79:
FACTS

1.Op Sealion was a bluff, </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Furher Directive 16 states otherwise, as does the massive conversion of tanks, training of troops and assembly of equipment. You don't divert 50% of the canal barges in Europe unless you intend to carry out your plan.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content"> doomed if indeed carried away. </div></BLOCKQUOTE> I agree here. The logisitcal plan made be the German High Command was completely inadequate to support the 9 1/2 divisions earmarked for the inital phase of operations, let alone the follow on waves.

The preconditions for success required a RAF and RN unable to resist, and an English Channel that behaved like a mill pond.

Besides, historically speaking, in Sep-Oct-1940, there was only one period of fair weather and light seas for a crossing to be effected.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">2.RAF did win BOB, thanks to Goering, LW intelligence and english RADAR, BE SURE. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

As well as the Civilian Repair Organisation, Dowding's harbouring of resources, the Observer Corps, and Bomber Command (little recongised and much undervalued role).

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">3.First priority of the reich was to make britain an ally or at least neutral to the cause, but britain didn't want to be the sidekick of noone as it had an agenda of its own. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Doubtful. Despite Hitler's talk of Anglo Saxon-Germanic "friendship" The Reich wanted to crush any opposition to its expansion policy. The British have a long established policy of not allowing the formation of a monolithic power bloc on the Continent.

It was inevitable that they go to war.

Besides, the Whermacht consciously targeted the BEF for destruction in the inital phase of the Battle of France. It was as much their steadfastness in defence as voon Runsted's decisions the halt at the canal lines that saved them, myth of the Blitzkrieg notwithstanding.

smokincrater
11-01-2007, 03:39 PM
The continued presence of a functioning Fighter Command was esstenial and the determining fact that Great Britain did not face invasion. My facts are:

1. Without a fighter force British bombers would be destroyed at their airfeilds or in the air(the bomber doesn`t always get though).

2. The Royal Navy would be destroyed at their moorings or while sortieing to the invasion area.( KG5 Battleships moves at a maximum of 55 km/h. JU-87 bombers move at 325 km/h. they have ample time to destroy them.)

3. Without bomber surpport the Btizkreig tatics favoured by the Luftwaffe and Whermant would easliy run circles around the less moblie British amry devoid of even heavy artillery.

MB_Avro_UK
11-01-2007, 03:40 PM
Hi all,

The Luftwaffe almost succeeded in clearing the RAF from the skies over southern England.

If they had done so, Churchill would have been replaced by a 'moderate' of whom there were many.

A negotiated settlement would have resulted between Britain and Germany. The British believed that an invasion was ready.

Britain would perhaps have kept her Empire and Hitler would have had a free hand in Europe. His attack on Russia would not have been delayed in 1941 due to British action in North Africa and Greece.

So,Hitler would not have had to fight a two-front war.

Churchill was not popular with many in the political establishment who regarded him as a 'war monger'.

And don't forget, Britain was a democracy during WW2 and there were many criticisms against Churchill in Parliament especially as regards the RAFs later bombing campaign against German cities.

An interesting topic but it has been aired before on this forum.

Best Regards,
MB_Avro.

Wepps
11-01-2007, 03:46 PM
I believe the truth is as you have heard it.

However, England was not in nearly the danger it seemed at the time.

The Royal Navy would surely have stopped a German invasion, even if the RAF were destroyed. My reasoning is this:

The Germans, in the early anti-convoy operations in the English Channel, before the Battle of Britain, proved the Luftwaffe incapable of stopping a fleet. They were ineffective versus the convoys.

Now if they couldn't hold their own against unarmed shipping, they surely would never have been able to deal the crippling blow to the RN that Goering claimed.

As far as I can tell, everybody has just assumed that the Luftwaffe could do this. I maintain they couldn't, and proved it just prior to Adler Tag.

anarchy52
11-01-2007, 03:47 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by ImpStarDuece:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by waffen-79:
FACTS

1.Op Sealion was a bluff, </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Furher Directive 16 states otherwise, as does the massive conversion of tanks, training of troops and assembly of equipment. You don't divert 50% of the canal barges in Europe unless you intend to carry out your plan.
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I disagree, in order to pull off a bluff, it must be convincing, hence the barges.

hop2002
11-01-2007, 04:00 PM
The problem with the theory that Sealion was a bluff is that the German records, up to the highest levels, show the operation was serious.

It's certainly true that Hitler didn't relish a seaborne invasion, and he hoped that the Luftwaffe could do the job alone, but all the German records show preparations were in earnest, even if they were inadequate.

smokincrater
11-01-2007, 04:07 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Wepps:
I believe the truth is as you have heard it.

However, England was not in nearly the danger it seemed at the time.

The Royal Navy would surely have stopped a German invasion, even if the RAF were destroyed. My reasoning is this:

The Germans, in the early anti-convoy operations in the English Channel, before the Battle of Britain, proved the Luftwaffe incapable of stopping a fleet. They were ineffective versus the convoys.

Now if they couldn't hold their own against unarmed shipping, they surely would never have been able to deal the crippling blow to the RN that Goering claimed.

As far as I can tell, everybody has just assumed that the Luftwaffe could do this. I maintain they couldn't, and proved it just prior to Adler Tag. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I disagree the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repluse(a year and a bit after BOB) shows what air power can do against capital ships. And furthermore the 1942 `Channel Dash` showed that ships operating against air power require large amounts of fighter surpport.

stathem
11-01-2007, 04:10 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by anarchy52:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by ImpStarDuece:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by waffen-79:
FACTS

1.Op Sealion was a bluff, </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Furher Directive 16 states otherwise, as does the massive conversion of tanks, training of troops and assembly of equipment. You don't divert 50% of the canal barges in Europe unless you intend to carry out your plan.
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I disagree, in order to pull off a bluff, it must be convincing, hence the barges. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Then you've obviously no idea how much it crippled the movement of material in Central Europe having all those barges sat in Calais and Boulogne doing sweet FA, nor how much the Germans were paying the owners in compo.

Wepps
11-01-2007, 04:31 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by smokincrater:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Wepps:
I believe the truth is as you have heard it.

However, England was not in nearly the danger it seemed at the time.

The Royal Navy would surely have stopped a German invasion, even if the RAF were destroyed. My reasoning is this:

The Germans, in the early anti-convoy operations in the English Channel, before the Battle of Britain, proved the Luftwaffe incapable of stopping a fleet. They were ineffective versus the convoys.

Now if they couldn't hold their own against unarmed shipping, they surely would never have been able to deal the crippling blow to the RN that Goering claimed.

As far as I can tell, everybody has just assumed that the Luftwaffe could do this. I maintain they couldn't, and proved it just prior to Adler Tag. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I disagree the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repluse(a year and a bit after BOB) shows what air power can do against capital ships. And furthermore the 1942 `Channel Dash` showed that ships operating against air power require large amounts of fighter surpport. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Agreed, but the practical reality of that is that it was the Japanese that did that. They were well trained in naval interdiction.

The Germans were not. Neither was the Luftwaffe equipped for such operations.

The 1942 reference doesn't work. This was 1940. The German realization that there was merit in such activity was not realized until that time, way too late for Sea Lion.

HuninMunin
11-01-2007, 04:39 PM
So what happened to british shipping around and after the Battle Of Crete?
Or what happened to the Italian fleet on September the 9th, 1943?
What miracel gave the Luftwaffe the input on "how to"?

MrMojok
11-01-2007, 04:40 PM
I find this guy's article mildly offensive.

Wepps
11-01-2007, 04:43 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by HuninMunin:
So what happened to british shipping around and after the Battle Of Crete?
Or what happened to the Italian fleet on September the 9th, 1943? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'm not debating the value of air power in a naval campaign.

I'm simply providing the fact that GERMANY...in 1940...was unprepared for such a campaign.

In fact it wasn't until mid-1942 where German naval/air campaigns became effective enough to be countered. Some of this was thrown at the Black Sea Fleet, and even then was essentially ineffective - versus WWI era warships!

Though the Japanese and British, naval powers in their right, and later the Americans showed its value, the Germans were forced by their industrial and resource condition to ignore that kind of war except in minor situations.

This is the same reason you didn't see strategic bombers in the east. They simply didn't have the resources to conduct that kind of war.

HuninMunin
11-01-2007, 04:48 PM
There was no strategical bombing in the east because the whole doctrin demanded a different aproach.
Crete was no naval campaign either, quite the opposite.
Your assumption that ( given air superiority ) the Luftwaffe would have been unable to inflict serious losses to the Royal Navy is a little blue eyed.

XyZspineZyX
11-01-2007, 05:27 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Skoshi Tiger:
I was reading the local news paper today and found a half page spread titled 'The new Battle of Britain'.

It is about some wag of a historian (Andrew *******) that reconds that the Royal Navy saved England from the Germans and that the RAF part in it was 'exaggerated' and that "many pilots were so badly trained that could not shoot straight"

The article describes Britains "primitive" radar system was not as effective as claimed and that it was "subject to exaggerated accounts designed to gain more funding from Chirchills government"

Now I'm not much of a millitary tactician or historian, but I pretty sure that with out close to total air superiority any invasion (in either direction) accross the channel would have been a disaster.

Without the RAF I doubt the Royal Navy could have opperated inside a confined space like the channel without massive losses.

It doesn't take an Einstien to work out that the defense of Britain was a team effort and that without support the RAF recieved (RFD, Observer corps, Home Guard Army, Navy etc) things could have gone a lot worse for Britain.

There was one statement, which I assume to be based on fact, was that only one in seven RAF pilots could claim a kill durring the Battle. It's going to be a bummer if BoB turns out like that! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

This Mr ******* has neatly ignored the entire issue of what the Battle of Britain <span class="ev_code_YELLOW">was</span>. The fact is that two major air forces clashed with no direct input from their respective armies or navies

that fact is hard to spin

MB_Avro_UK
11-01-2007, 05:41 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by BBB462cid:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Skoshi Tiger:
I was reading the local news paper today and found a half page spread titled 'The new Battle of Britain'.

It is about some wag of a historian (Andrew *******) that reconds that the Royal Navy saved England from the Germans and that the RAF part in it was 'exaggerated' and that "many pilots were so badly trained that could not shoot straight"

The article describes Britains "primitive" radar system was not as effective as claimed and that it was "subject to exaggerated accounts designed to gain more funding from Chirchills government"

Now I'm not much of a millitary tactician or historian, but I pretty sure that with out close to total air superiority any invasion (in either direction) accross the channel would have been a disaster.

Without the RAF I doubt the Royal Navy could have opperated inside a confined space like the channel without massive losses.

It doesn't take an Einstien to work out that the defense of Britain was a team effort and that without support the RAF recieved (RFD, Observer corps, Home Guard Army, Navy etc) things could have gone a lot worse for Britain.

There was one statement, which I assume to be based on fact, was that only one in seven RAF pilots could claim a kill durring the Battle. It's going to be a bummer if BoB turns out like that! </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

This Mr ******* has neatly ignored the entire issue of what the Battle of Britain <span class="ev_code_YELLOW">was</span>. The fact is that two major air forces clashed with no direct input from their respective armies or navies

that fact is hard to spin </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/agreepost.gif

Best Regards,
MB_Avro.

Von_Rat
11-01-2007, 06:21 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Wepps:
I believe the truth is as you have heard it.

However, England was not in nearly the danger it seemed at the time.

The Royal Navy would surely have stopped a German invasion, even if the RAF were destroyed. My reasoning is this:

The Germans, in the early anti-convoy operations in the English Channel, before the Battle of Britain, proved the Luftwaffe incapable of stopping a fleet. They were ineffective versus the convoys.

Now if they couldn't hold their own against unarmed shipping, they surely would never have been able to deal the crippling blow to the RN that Goering claimed.

As far as I can tell, everybody has just assumed that the Luftwaffe could do this. I maintain they couldn't, and proved it just prior to Adler Tag. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

agreed

only the japanese in 1940 were really capable of stopping a fleet with airpower.

the destroyers that were posted in the channel, in heavily defended archorages btw, would of been enough to wreck the pig pile german fleet. the capital ships wouldnt of been needed.

also it was planned to pull the raf to the north if losses ran to high. then when the invasion was launched the raf would rengauge. while this would probaly result in the raf having to fly from wrecked or hastliy erected af's or at longer ranges, it still means that no matter what the rn would have some aircover over the channel.


imo the british people had their blood up. a setback such as having to withdraw the raf further north wasnt going to cause them to roll over for hitler, despite what a handful of peace minded politicians wanted. britain was a democracy afterall.

Von_Rat
11-01-2007, 06:27 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by HuninMunin:
So what happened to british shipping around and after the Battle Of Crete?
</div></BLOCKQUOTE>


the rn despite its losses prevented the seabourne reinforcment of crete.

they only had to do the same in the channel, and they were willing to accept any losses to do it. churchill said they would of sacrifaced the navy to stop the invasion.

also unlike crete the rn would have some air support even if the germans won tempory control of south englands airapace. see above.

leitmotiv
11-01-2007, 06:31 PM
Anybody who doubts the capability of the Luftwaffe to attack warships ignores the Norwegian Campaign of April-June 1940. The Luftwaffe had a variety of bombs suitable for maritime attack from high-explosive to semi-armor-piercing to armor piercing, and they had pin-point delivery systems capable of trucking big bombs, the Ju 87 and Ju 88. They had two specialist maritime attack Geschwadern, KG30 with the Ju 88, and KG26 with the He 111 level bomber. KGr100 (He 111) was trained to operate against ships, too. The Ju 87s had recently had a great deal of experience operating against Allied warships off Norway, off France, and in the Channel.

The Royal Navy had learned it could not operate without air cover after being punished off Norway. The main fleet had been forced to withdraw in the face of German air attack. RODNEY had been hit on the deck by an AP bomb (luckily for her, a dud). SUFFOLK returned to Scapa awash after being attacked for hours by German bombers. The fleet was forced to operate only in the presence of fleet carriers ARK ROYAL and GLORIOUS which carried fighters (FURIOUS did not have fighters on board).

If Fighter Command had been neutralized, the Luftwaffe could have made the Royal Navy pay a fierce price to try to interdict a German invasion. The fleet was kept in readiness at Rosyth and Plymouth to interdict an invasion.

Actually, probably the best defense the British had against invasion was their ingenious plan to release gasoline on the water and ignite it.

smokincrater
11-01-2007, 06:35 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Actually, probably the best defense the British had against invasion was their ingenious plan to release gasoline on the water and ignite it. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Goulish and interesting!!! http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/784.gif

leitmotiv
11-01-2007, 06:43 PM
FDR was so concerned Churchill would expend the fleet to save the UK, he wanted Churchill to withdraw the fleet to the U.S. in 1940. Churchill, of course, had no intention of expending the fleet to save the UK. It would have been withdrawn to protect the Empire. Thus, the chance of a naval Gotterdamerung between the Royal Navy and the Luftwaffe was nil.

smokincrater
11-01-2007, 06:49 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
FDR was so concerned Churchill would expend the fleet to save the UK, he wanted Churchill to withdraw the fleet to the U.S. in 1940. Churchill, of course, had no intention of expending the fleet to save the UK. It would have been withdrawn to protect the Empire. Thus, the chance of a naval Gotterdamerung between the Royal Navy and the Luftwaffe was nil. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

My thoughts excatly. Douglas Pound was never going to risk the fleet to air attack.

Von_Rat
11-01-2007, 06:51 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
FDR was so concerned Churchill would expend the fleet to save the UK, he wanted Churchill to withdraw the fleet to the U.S. in 1940. Churchill, of course, had no intention of expending the fleet to save the UK. It would have been withdrawn to protect the Empire. Thus, the chance of a naval Gotterdamerung between the Royal Navy and the Luftwaffe was nil. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

do you have a source for that, because thats not what i have read. churchill had every intention of sacrifacing the fleet if need be.

anyway the destroyers on station in the channel would of been sufficent to wreck the pigpile german fleet. and as i said before, no matter what there would be some aircover.

HuninMunin
11-01-2007, 06:54 PM
And you think the "pigpile-fleet" would have set out from harbor without a Götterdämmerung as Leitmotiv has put it?

Schwarz.13
11-01-2007, 06:55 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
Modern British historians have a ritual. To prove they are free of sentiment, they have to eventually write a book trashing the B of B as a non-event. Parkinson and Overy are two classic examples. It's part of the reductio ad absurdum attitude of the modern British academic class---nothing really matters, human affairs are absurd. Delighting in the stomps of your forefathers is atavistic jingoism. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I wonder Leitmotiv, what is your opinion of 'The Most Dangerous Enemy' (http://www.airwarfare.com/AWX/features/reviews/images/books/mostdangerous.jpg) by Stephen Bungay?

In my opinion it is the most meticulously researched (but easily readable) and objective (as far as any book written by a single historian can be) account of the Battle of Britain we have to date and i highly doubt a better book will be written on the subject for a long time (if ever).

And this Dr Andrew ******* i saw on the news the other night - 'grenade-thrower' would seem a most apt term (but i prefer '*****' myself)...

Von_Rat
11-01-2007, 07:12 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by HuninMunin:
And you think the "pigpile-fleet" would have set out from harbor without a Götterdämmerung as Leitmotiv has put it? </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

i dont think i understand.

all the rn, well the ships assigned to anti invasion duty anyway, had to do was sit and wait till the german fleet, such as it was, sailed. them hit them, along with the reintroduced raf. the lw would then hit the raf and the rn. i guess that would be your Götterdämmerung.

before the invasion was cancelled the germans didnt have much luck trying to sink the locally based destroyers in their defended anchorages. if thats what your thinking. though i think they were forced to move from dover, cant recall immediatly.

leitmotiv
11-01-2007, 07:26 PM
The wrangle between Churchill and Roosevelt about the fleet is entertainingly described in Irving's CHURCHILL'S WAR, Charmley's CHURCHILL: THE END OF GLORY, and any good diplomatic history of the Churchill years. Of course Churchill had no intention of sacrificing the fleet. The UK was a small part of the British Empire. Without the fleet, the Empire would have been lost. There would never have been a Gotterdamerung between the fleet and the Luftwaffe. If Fighter Command had been destroyed, the UK was expected to fight to the death, literally, against the invasion. Poison gas would have been used, it would have been very nasty, but, of course, the Germans would have won, and, if they had taken the UK, they would have all but won the war. The USSR would not have been able to stand against the full force of the German Wehrmacht, air, land, and sea, concentrated against them.

HuninMunin
11-01-2007, 07:28 PM
That is because all that ever happened in reality was the prelude to Sealion - the struggle for air superiority.
If we assume that the operation was more then smoke and bang to scare England out of the war, we can assume furthermore that the retaliation bombing raids towards London would have never happened.
The Luftwaffe had concentrated on the RAF like it did in August and ( looking at the numbers ) would eventually have won this counterair-offensive.
The RAF would have "escaped" with what is left to the north and now has to try to somehow heal the wounds.
In the meantime the Luftwaffe shifts it's focus to anything that could hinder a naval invasion - Stukas, 111s, 88s and 17s fly rolling attacks towards fortifications, infrastructure ( such as the very vurnarable but equaly vital railroad system ) harbors and finaly british vessels.

With what would the RAF hinder these attacks?
Who replaces the countless fallen pilots?

My point is that the invasion would never have taken place with an intact RN - and that the RAF did not have the means to defend the navy once pushed back to the north.

leitmotiv
11-01-2007, 07:39 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by Schwarz.13:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
Modern British historians have a ritual. To prove they are free of sentiment, they have to eventually write a book trashing the B of B as a non-event. Parkinson and Overy are two classic examples. It's part of the reductio ad absurdum attitude of the modern British academic class---nothing really matters, human affairs are absurd. Delighting in the stomps of your forefathers is atavistic jingoism. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I wonder Leitmotiv, what is your opinion of 'The Most Dangerous Enemy' (http://www.airwarfare.com/AWX/features/reviews/images/books/mostdangerous.jpg) by Stephen Bungay?

In my opinion it is the most meticulously researched (but easily readable) and objective (as far as any book written by a single historian can be) account of the Battle of Britain we have to date and i highly doubt a better book will be written on the subject for a long time (if ever).

And this Dr Andrew ******* i saw on the news the other night - 'grenade-thrower' would seem a most apt term (but i prefer '*****' myself)... </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have the book, it looks superb. Since discovering flight sims, I have become an illiterate idiot. I do not read anymore. I even creep over to Wiki for information I have become so slothful. It is one of dozens of books I ought to read. The last really good book about the B of B I read was THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN by Richard Hough. Another excellent book about the RAF, can't recommend highly enough, is THE RIGHT OF THE LINE by John Terraine. It is a history of the RAF in the whole war. It is superbly researched, fair, balanced, and fascinating. Much of what he wrote was new to me.

Von_Rat
11-01-2007, 07:40 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by HuninMunin:
That is because all that ever happened in reality was the prelude to Sealion - the struggle for air superiority.
If we assume that the operation was more then smoke and bang to scare England out of the war, we can assume furthermore that the retaliation bombing raids towards London would have never happened.
The Luftwaffe had concentrated on the RAF like it did in August and ( looking at the numbers ) would eventually have won this counterair-offensive.
The RAF would have "escaped" with what is left to the north and now has to try to somehow heal the wounds.
In the meantime the Luftwaffe shifts it's focus to anything that could hinder a naval invasion - Stukas, 111s, 88s and 17s fly rolling attacks towards fortifications, infrastructure ( such as the very vurnarable but equaly vital railroad system ) harbors and finaly british vessels.

With what would the RAF hinder these attacks?
Who replaces the countless fallen pilots?

My point is that the invasion would never have taken place with an intact RN - and that the RAF did not have the means to defend the navy once pushed back to the north. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


the raf was never going to be destroyed. it still would of been a potent force even if it was forced north. the plan was to withdraw if numbers fell to a certain point.

if it was forced north and the lw concentrated on the locally based rn. then the rn would of withdrawn the locally based ships out of range also, till the german fleet sailed. then they'd come roaring back along with the raf. the germans might of got across but then their fleet would of been massicured, thus no reinforcments.

the lw was never going to get a chance to destroy the rn without risking their fleet.

Schwarz.13
11-01-2007, 07:44 PM
Surely what would have happened had Fighter Command failed to stop the Luftwaffe is purely academic speculation and therefore a mute point - a 'what if', just like the countless others of WWII!

Which somewhat goes against what this 'grenade-thrower' ******* is trying to convince us and the point of this whole thread...

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:I have the book, it looks superb. Since discovering flight sims, I have become an illiterate idiot. I do not read anymore. I even creep over to Wiki for information I have become so slothful. It is one of dozens of books I ought to read. The last really good book about the B of B I read was THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN by Richard Hough. Another excellent book about the RAF, can't recommend highly enough, is THE RIGHT OF THE LINE by John Terraine. It is a history of the RAF in the whole war. It is superbly researched, fair, balanced, and fascinating. Much of what he wrote was new to me. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Funny you should say that - i have a quite a decent military history book collection and have been an avid book reader for a few years. However since staring to play IL2 i too have become an illiterate sloth http://forums.ubi.com/images/smilies/51.gif

leitmotiv
11-01-2007, 07:48 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by HuninMunin:
That is because all that ever happened in reality was the prelude to Sealion - the struggle for air superiority.
If we assume that the operation was more then smoke and bang to scare England out of the war, we can assume furthermore that the retaliation bombing raids towards London would have never happened.
The Luftwaffe had concentrated on the RAF like it did in August and ( looking at the numbers ) would eventually have won this counterair-offensive.
The RAF would have "escaped" with what is left to the north and now has to try to somehow heal the wounds.
In the meantime the Luftwaffe shifts it's focus to anything that could hinder a naval invasion - Stukas, 111s, 88s and 17s fly rolling attacks towards fortifications, infrastructure ( such as the very vurnarable but equaly vital railroad system ) harbors and finaly british vessels.

With what would the RAF hinder these attacks?
Who replaces the countless fallen pilots?

My point is that the invasion would never have taken place with an intact RN - and that the RAF did not have the means to defend the navy once pushed back to the north. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Exactly. No Fighter Command, no Royal Navy to defend the Channel. If the Luftwaffe had kept hammering away at the Kent airfields they might have achieved air superiority over the south. The biggest factor working against them was the attrition of Bf 109s. Because German production was still on a peacetime basis, unlike Britain, they were unable to replace their 109 losses fast enough. Most likely, most of the 109s were being lost in ditching from running out of fuel, or ordinary operational attrition. With fewer and fewer 109s the Luftwaffe could not protect its bombers. If all of the 109s had been fitted to carry drop tanks on Eagle Day, the Luftwaffe's chances would have been enormously better. Better yet, a drop tank under each wing!

BOBSOW is likely to produce a bumper crop of p----d-off 109 pilots who will have to break off actions constantly due to the red light, and, I suspect many will push the envelope, and end up in the "Kanal" or on a beach near Calais.

Von_Rat
11-01-2007, 07:48 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
The wrangle between Churchill and Roosevelt about the fleet is entertainingly described in Irving's CHURCHILL'S WAR, Charmley's CHURCHILL: THE END OF GLORY, and any good diplomatic history of the Churchill years. Of course Churchill had no intention of sacrificing the fleet. The UK was a small part of the British Empire. Without the fleet, the Empire would have been lost. There would never have been a Gotterdamerung between the fleet and the Luftwaffe. If Fighter Command had been destroyed, the UK was expected to fight to the death, literally, against the invasion. Poison gas would have been used, it would have been very nasty, but, of course, the Germans would have won, and, if they had taken the UK, they would have all but won the war. The USSR would not have been able to stand against the full force of the German Wehrmacht, air, land, and sea, concentrated against them. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

i have no doubt what you say about fdr is true. but if im not mistaken it was in churchills own history of the second world war where he states he was ready to sacrefice the fleet to stop the invasion.

anyway as stated above the capital ships wouldnt be needed. you cant reallly believe he'd let england fall just because he was afraid of losing a couple dozen destroyers and a few criusers stopping a invasion.

fighter command was never going to be completly destroyed before a invasion. as stated above it was to be withdrawn to the north if numbers fell below a certain point. it would return south only in case of invasion. true its effectivness would be reduced, but it still would be able to provide some aircover. imo more than enough.

SlowBurn68
11-01-2007, 07:50 PM
Didn't the p-47's and their 50cals win the Battle of Brittan?

Von_Rat
11-01-2007, 07:55 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by HuninMunin:
That is because all that ever happened in reality was the prelude to Sealion - the struggle for air superiority.
If we assume that the operation was more then smoke and bang to scare England out of the war, we can assume furthermore that the retaliation bombing raids towards London would have never happened.
The Luftwaffe had concentrated on the RAF like it did in August and ( looking at the numbers ) would eventually have won this counterair-offensive.
The RAF would have "escaped" with what is left to the north and now has to try to somehow heal the wounds.
In the meantime the Luftwaffe shifts it's focus to anything that could hinder a naval invasion - Stukas, 111s, 88s and 17s fly rolling attacks towards fortifications, infrastructure ( such as the very vurnarable but equaly vital railroad system ) harbors and finaly british vessels.

With what would the RAF hinder these attacks?
Who replaces the countless fallen pilots?

My point is that the invasion would never have taken place with an intact RN - and that the RAF did not have the means to defend the navy once pushed back to the north. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Exactly. No Fighter Command, no Royal Navy to defend the Channel. . </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

the lw was never going to get a chance to destroy the rn without risking their fleet. see above.

leitmotiv
11-01-2007, 08:03 PM
Unfortunately, the Royal Navy did not have a "couple dozen" destroyers or cruisers to expend. The RN was on the ropes for destroyers after Dunkirk---that was why Churchill begged for the surplus U.S. WWI destroyers FDR was only able to send in 1941. Same for cruisers. The imperial lifelines were the most important factor in 1940. To give you an idea of how important the Empire was, Churchill sent troops and tanks from the UK to Egypt in the summer of 1940 to reinforce against the impending Italian invasion. Churchill had no intention of destroying the fleet to protect the UK.

Von_Rat
11-01-2007, 08:13 PM
as this link shows http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_anti-invasion_prep...ld_War_II#Royal_Navy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_anti-invasion_preparations_of_World_War_II#Royal_Navy)

the rn had more than that locally based, for anti invasion duties. they were there to stop a invasion even if they were forced to sacrefice themselves. they didnt have to risk the home fleet.


the empire was nothing without the home islands. where do you think those tanks came from, (unless they were lendlease, but you get my point). no home islands, no more tanks, or empire either. churchill knew that. im talking about the empire outside of the dominions btw. the dominions would of course survive but the rest of the empire, forget it.

in fact iirc correctly churchill even stated, no home islands no empire, or words to that effect, but i'll be dammed if i can remember where.


the people who ran that wargame in the 70s at sandhurst came to the conclusion that the germans would of failed. thats good enough for me.


anyway i find im repeating myself. i guess we'll never convince each other, but its been a nice debate.

Whirlin_merlin
11-02-2007, 02:38 AM
The RAF won the Battle OF Britian but not the Battle FOR Britian.

By the Battle FOR Britian I'm mean preventing invasion.
Inorder to invade the German forces had hugh obstacles to over come, RN, RAF, geography etc.
With hindsight they never had a chance. Did they know at the time? Many must have realised . Was it a bluff? Maybe later but not at first.

The Battle OF Britain was the fight for air supremacy over Britian (or at least S England).
This is of course tied up with the Battle FOR Britian as air supremacy was one of the obstacles that needed to be overcome.
The LW never got that air supremacy so it became moot that the RN obstacle still stood as well, the early part of the War had shown how warfare had changed and that air supremacy was now the keystone to victory on the ground.

In the fight for that air supremacy the RAF won, I've seen some claim it was a draw, but in this sort of situation for the defenders a draw is a victory.

It was also greatly significant that this was the first time the German War machine was made to faulter, Europe was folding up at their feet and to allies and axis alike they must have seemed unstoppable. That is until September of 1940, and the RAF did that, they made the world see that the Germans could be beaten. That shouldn't be underestimated.

Of course had Hitler not been distracted by his Russian folly things may have turned out differently in the long run, luckily we will never know.

hop2002
11-02-2007, 03:34 AM
Churchill committed 1 carrier, 4 battleships, 11 cruisers and 32 destroyers in a bid to save Crete. I think saving Britain would have a slightly higher priority than that.

djetz
11-02-2007, 03:44 AM
If the RAF hadn't won the battle of Britain that guy would be writing his articles in German.

How about this... the armed forces of the UK and the Commonwealth, with significant help from elements of European armed forces which had escaped to Britain from Nazi-occupied countries, won the Battle of Britain. And we're all glad they did. Except David Irving and a bunch of idiot neo-Nazis.

I think that about covers it. Next question?

luftluuver
11-02-2007, 06:34 AM
Forty British, six French and a Polish destroyer took part in the evacuation of Dunkirk.

The Royal Navy's losses in the operation were six destroyers:

* Grafton, sunk by U-62 on 29 May;
* Grenade, sunk by air attack off the east pier at Dunkirk on 29 May;
* Wakeful, sunk by a torpedo from a Schnellboot (E-boat) S-30 on 29 May;
* Basilisk, Havant, and Keith, sunk by air attack off the beaches on 1 June.

So 4 of the 6 lost were to air attack and all 4 were dead in the water loading troops.

The French Navy lost three destroyers:

* Bourrasque, mined off Nieuport on 30 May;
* Sirocco, sunk by the Schnellboot S-23 and S-26 on 31 May;
* Le Foudroyant, sunk by air attack off the beaches on 1 June.

So only 1 of 3 lost to air attack.

Nice site on the Royal Navy http://www.naval-history.net/index.htm

leitmotiv
11-02-2007, 08:20 AM
As usual, another deep dish of out-of-context internet trash from LL. To understand the strategic position of the Royal Navy following upon the losses sustained in the Norwegian Campaign and the Dunkirk evacuation, I recommend Correlli Barnett's ENGAGE THE ENEMY MORE CLOSELY which explains the tough situation of the Royal Navy regarding destroyers. They could not afford any losses with the North Atlantic convoys to protect, the Home Fleet to protect, the Channel convoys to protect, and, suddenly, a war with Italy. Seven British (including one Polish serving with the RN) destroyers were sunk in the Norwegian Campaign, and nineteen British destroyers were damaged (NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE CAMPAIGN IN NORWAY [Naval Staff History]. Whitehall History Publishing/Cass, London, 2000. Pages 165-67).

stathem
11-02-2007, 08:47 AM
Leit, you're a card.

How can you argue this positon;


<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
Anybody who doubts the capability of the Luftwaffe to attack warships ignores the Norwegian Campaign of April-June 1940. The Luftwaffe had a variety of bombs suitable for maritime attack from high-explosive to semi-armor-piercing to armor piercing, and they had pin-point delivery systems capable of trucking big bombs, the Ju 87 and Ju 88. They had two specialist maritime attack Geschwadern, KG30 with the Ju 88, and KG26 with the He 111 level bomber. KGr100 (He 111) was trained to operate against ships, too. The Ju 87s had recently had a great deal of experience operating against Allied warships off Norway, off France, and in the Channel.

The Royal Navy had learned it could not operate without air cover after being punished off Norway. The main fleet had been forced to withdraw in the face of German air attack. RODNEY had been hit on the deck by an AP bomb (luckily for her, a dud). SUFFOLK returned to Scapa awash after being attacked for hours by German bombers. The fleet was forced to operate only in the presence of fleet carriers ARK ROYAL and GLORIOUS which carried fighters (FURIOUS did not have fighters on board).

If Fighter Command had been neutralized, the Luftwaffe could have made the Royal Navy pay a fierce price to try to interdict a German invasion. The fleet was kept in readiness at Rosyth and Plymouth to interdict an invasion.

Actually, probably the best defense the British had against invasion was their ingenious plan to release gasoline on the water and ignite it. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>


and in almost the same breath, in this thread (http://forums.ubi.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/23110283/m/5071055206/p/3) argue an almost completely opposed position

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by leitmotiv:
PRINCE and REP were the first battleships sunk at sea on 10 Dec 1941. Noteworthy, it wasn't until 1943 another was sunk at sea by an aircraft---ROMA, which was sunk by the radio-controlled Fritz-X AP bomb. Then, it was not until more than a year later another was sunk, MUSASHI, in October 1944, and it took a mass attack to put her under. The next battleship sunk at sea by aircraft was YAMATO in April 1945. Thus, in the entire Second World War the supposedly invincible aircraft claimed only five dreadnoughts at sea, and four were sunk by massed attacks.

Billy Mitchell's Martin bombers sank the unmanned OSTFRIESLAND with bombs in 1922. Interestingly, the damage which sank the old dreadnought was not caused by direct hits, but near-misses by the large bombs which mined her hull </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

luftluuver
11-02-2007, 10:13 AM
Out of context? http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

Just posted the RN losses at Dunkirk.

How many destroyers sunk by a/c in Norway?

You were the one babbling about the expertise of the LW against ships liety.

HuninMunin
11-02-2007, 10:33 AM
Your thought to take Dunkirk as a reference concerning anti-shiping capabilities of the Luftwaffe is semi-usefull.
Hitler himself delayed and hindered the probable massacre and the KGs were busy elsewhere regardless.
The whole western campaign shows the extreme reluctance of Hitler to wage the total war against Great Britain.
After the Wehrmacht first marched into Paris his eyes where looking eastwards.

hop2002
11-02-2007, 11:38 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Hitler himself delayed and hindered the probable massacre </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Von Runstead called the first halt. Hitler confirmed it the next day, with Goering promising to do the job instead. When Guderain sent his tanks in a few days later, he was soon arguing that he needed time to regroup, that the terrain was unsuitable for tanks, and that the reduction of the Dunkirk pocket was better left to infantry.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">and the KGs were busy elsewhere regardless. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

According to Hooton, the Luftwaffe daily bomber and dive bomber sorties to Dunkirk were:

27 May - 300
28 May - 75
29 May - 410
30 May - 45
31 May - 195
1 June - 485
2 June - 305

That's about 260 bomber sorties a day. If you compare that to the BoB, the Germans averaged about 34 bomber sorties a day in July, about 145 a day in August, and about 150 a day in September. (that excludes night sorties, which increased greatly during the battle)

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">The whole western campaign shows the extreme reluctance of Hitler to wage the total war against Great Britain. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, he used the Luftwaffe against British troops evacuating the continent, killing about 3,000 on just one ship, the Lancastria. He unleashed the Luftwaffe against British cities, killing over a thousand civilians in August, before ordering the all out attacks on London. 7000 British civilians died in September.

Hitler had no compunction about declaring all out war on Britain, he was just knew how risky a seaborne invasion would be.

That's why the plan, from the very start, called for the Luftwaffe to defeat the RAF, before the invasion began.

Kurfurst__
11-02-2007, 12:27 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by hop2002:
The problem with the theory that Sealion was a bluff is that the German records, up to the highest levels, show the operation was serious.

It's certainly true that Hitler didn't relish a seaborne invasion, and he hoped that the Luftwaffe could do the job alone, but all the German records show preparations were in earnest, even if they were inadequate. </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Interesting Hop.

I wonder if you could name me just 5 from all those German records which you`ve just made up, that show this.

luftluuver
11-02-2007, 01:22 PM
Order of battle - Unternehmen Seelöwe (Sealion)

(the planned invasion of the United Kingdom, Sep 1940)

Army Group A

Commander-in-Chief: Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt

Chief of the General Staff: General der Infanterie Georg von Sodenstern

Operations Officer (Ia): Oberst Günther Blumentritt

16th Army

Commander-in-Chief: Generaloberst Ernst Busch

Chief of the General Staff: Generalleutnant Walter Model

Operations Officer (Ia): Oberst Hans Boeckh-Behrens

Luftwaffe Commander (Koluft) 16th Army: Oberst Dr. med. dent. Walter Gnamm

Division Command z.b.V. 454: Charakter als Generalleutnant Rudolf Krantz (This staff served as the 16th Army's Heimatstab or Home Staff Unit, which managed the assembly and loading of all troops, equipment and supplies; provided command and logistical support for all forces still on the Continent; and the reception and further transport of wounded and prisoners of war as well as damaged equipment. General der Infanterie Albrecht Schubert's XXIII Army Corps served as the 16th Army's Befehlsstelle Festland or Mainland Command, which reported to the staff of Generalleutnant Krantz. The corps maintained traffic control units and loading staffs at Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, Antwerp and Rotterdam.)

FIRST WAVE

XIII Army Corps: General der Panzertruppe Heinrich-Gottfried von Vietinghoff genannt Scheel (First-wave landings on English coast between Folkestone and New Romney) – Luftwaffe II./Flak-Regiment 14 attached to corps

17th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Herbert Loch

35th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Hans Wolfgang Reinhard

VII Army Corps: Generaloberst Eugen Ritter von Schobert (First-wave landings on English coast between Rye and Hastings) – Luftwaffe I./Flak-Regiment 26 attached to corps

1st Mountain Division: Generalleutnant Ludwig Kübler

7th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Eccard Freiherr von Gablenz

SECOND WAVE

V Army Corps: General der Infanterie Richard Ruoff (Transferred from the first to the second wave in early September 1940 so that the second echelons of the two first-wave corps could cross simultaneously with their first echelons)

12th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach

30th Infantry Division: General der Infanterie Kurt von Briesen

XXXXI Army Corps: General der Panzertruppe Georg-Hans Reinhardt

8th Panzer Division: Generalleutnant Adolf Kuntzen – Luftwaffe Light Flak-Abteilung 94 attached to division

10th Panzer Division: Generalleutnant Ferdinand Schaal – Luftwaffe Light Flak-Abteilung 71 attached to division

29th Infantry Division (Motorized): Generalmajor Walter von Boltenstern – Luftwaffe Light Flak-Abteilung 76 attached to division

Infantry Regiment "Großdeutschland": Oberst Wilhelm-Hunold von Stockhausen

Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Regiment: SS-Obergruppenführer Josef "Sepp" Dietrich

THIRD WAVE

IV Army Corps: General der Infanterie Viktor von Schwedler

24th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Hans von Tettau

58th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Iwan Heunert

XXXXII Army Corps: General der Pionere Walter Kuntze

45th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Friedrich Materna

164th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Josef Folttmann

9th Army (General der Artillerie Christian Hansen's X Army Corps headquarters staff with the attached Luftwaffe I./Flak-Regiment 29 was in addition allocated to the 9th Army for use with the first-wave troops)

Commander-in-Chief: Generaloberst Adolf Strauß

Chief of the General Staff: Generalleutnant Karl Adolf Hollidt

Operations Officer (Ia): Oberstleutnant Heinz von Gyldenfeldt

Luftwaffe Commander (Koluft) 9th Army: (possibly) Generalmajor Maximilian Kieffer *

Division Command z.b.V. 444: Generalmajor Alois Josef Ritter von Molo (This staff served as the 9th Army's Heimatstab or Home Staff Unit, which managed the assembly and loading of all troops, equipment and supplies; provided command and logistical support for all forces still on the Continent; and the reception and further transport of wounded and prisoners of war as well as damaged equipment. It maintained loading staffs at Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais.)

FIRST WAVE

XXXVIII Army Corps: General der Infanterie Erich von Lewinski genannt von Manstein (First-wave landings on English coast between Bexhill and Eastbourne) – Luftwaffe I./Flak-Regiment 3 attached to corps

26th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Sigismund von Föster

34th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Werner Sanne

VIII Army Corps: General der Artillerie Walter Heitz (First-wave landings on English coast between Beachy Head and Brighton) – Luftwaffe I./Flak-Regiment 36 attached to corps

6th Mountain Division: Generalmajor Ferdinand Schöner

8th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Rudolf Koch-Erpach

28th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Johann Sinnhuber

SECOND WAVE

XV Army Corps: Generaloberst Hermann Hoth

4th Panzer Division: Generalmajor Willibald Freiherr von Langermann und Erlencamp – Luftwaffe Light Flak-Abteilung 77 attached to division

7th Panzer Division: Generalmajor Erwin Rommel – Luftwaffe Light Flak-Abteilung 86 attached to division

20th Infantry Division (Motorized): Generalleutnant Mauritz von Wiktorin – Luftwaffe Light Flak-Abteilung 93 attached to division

THIRD WAVE

XXIV Army Corps: General der Panzertruppe Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg

15th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Ernst-Eberhard Hell

78th Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Curt Gallenkamp

Airborne Formations

7th Flieger-Division (Parachute): Generalmajor Richard Putzier (under Generalfeldmarschall Albert Keßelring's Luftflotte 2). The division was assigned drop zones in the area of Lyminge"”Sellinge"”Hythe on the right wing of the 16th Army and tasked with the immediate capture of the high ground north and northwest of Folkestone. The division consisted of Fallschirmjäger Regiments 1, 2 and 3 commanded by Oberst Bruno Bräuer, Oberst Alfred Sturm and Oberst Richard Heidrich respectively, and the Air Landing Assault Regiment commanded by Oberst Eugen Meindl. All four regiments were to be employed in the operation.

1. Kampfgruppe "Meindl" was to land at Hythe, secure crossings over the Royal Military Canal at and west of Hythe and advance along the line from Hythe rail station to Saltwood to prevent any flanking moves by the British.

2. Kampfgruppe "Stentzler" led by Major Edgar Stentzler, the commander of the II. Battalion of the Air Landing Assault Regiment was to drop and seize the heights at Paddlesworth and hold off any counter-attacks.

These two groups would be timed to drop as the landing craft carrying 17th Infantry Division hit the beach near Folkestone.

3. Kampfgruppe "Bräuer" was to drop an hour later south of Postling. This enlarged group would consist of a complete parachute battalion, a parachute engineer battalion, the antitank company of FJR1, all of FJR2 and FJR3, and an extra battalion as divisional reserve.

Once landed, Kampfgruppe "Bräuer" was to take Stentzler's group under its command and the combined force was to take Sandgate and the high ground west of Paddlesworth. FJR2 was to move north of Postling and guard against attack from the north while FJR3 was to secure the western flank with one battalion detached to capture and hold Lympe airfield for a later fly-in by 22nd Air Landing Division, possibly as late as S plus 5.

22nd Air Landing Infantry Division: Generalleutnant Hans Graf von Sponeck (under OKH control, but temporarily placed under the command of the 16th Army on 20 September 1940)

Bau-Lehr-Regiment z.b.V. 800 "Brandenburg" (In Invasion of England 1940: The Planning of Operation Sealion, author Peter Schenk notes very little source material exists on the role of the "Brandenburg" commandos in the operation. Schenk reconstructed the probable missions of the commandos from what little exits in the records of the first wave divisions and the recollections of former members of the regiment.)

16th Army Area of Operations

A 131-man commando team with 50 light motorcycles of the 1st Company of the I. Battalion would cross the channel with the 35th Infantry Division"”one platoon with the division's advanced detachment and one with Panzer Battalion D. Another commando team from the I. Battalion with three reconnaissance tanks would also land with the 17th Infantry Division. Upon landing, the "Brandenburg" company would link up with a combat group led by Oberst Edmund Hoffmeister, the commander of Infantry Regiment 21 of the 17th Infantry Division. Composed of elements of the 17th Infantry Division, the 7th Flieger-Division, corps-level support troops and Panzer Battalion B, Hoffmeister's battle group would push up the coast to Dover. The "Brandenburg" company would assist by taking out British positions on the coast and along the Royal Military Canal as well as suspected artillery positions to the north.

Another commando team consisting of elements of the regimental intelligence unit and most of the 4th Company of the I. Battalion would land with the first wave and attack Dover directly to prevent the sinking of block ships in the harbor entrance and to neutralize the coastal batteries on the Dover heights. (An alternative to landing this commando team with the first wave troops might have been the use of about 25 fast motorboats, i.e., customs authority and police boats, under command of Korvettenkapitän Strempel. Author Peter Schenk notes that Strempel was never informed of his objective, but it was likely Dover.)

9th Army Area of Operations

The 11th Company of the III. Battalion was allocated to the 9th Army for first wave employment as follows: two commando teams of 72 and 38 men were assigned to the 26th Infantry Division and one commando unit of 48 men to the 34th Infantry Division. Mounted on light motorcycles, the first two commando teams were assigned the mission of destroying the gun battery at Beachy Head and the radio station to the north of it; the 48-man team's mission is not recorded, but is was probably a similar task.

6th Army

Commander-in-Chief: Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Reichenau

Chief of the General Staff: Oberst Ferdinand Heim

Operations Officer (Ia): Oberst Anton-Reichard Freiherr von Mauchenheim genannt Bechtolsheim

The 6th Army held the II Army Corps (General der Infanterie Walter Graf von Brockdorff-Ahlefeldt) with the 6th Infantry Division and the 256th Infantry Division, commanded by Generalleutnant Arnold Freiherr von Biegeleben and Generalmajor Gerhard Kauffmann respectively, in readiness for potential landings in Lyme Bay between Weymouth and Lyme Regis. Cherbourg would serve as the embarkation port for the 6th Army's invasion forces. The 6th Army was under the command of Army Group C (Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb), which had taken over this function from Army Group B (Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock) on 11 September 1940.

OKH Reserves

These divisions, comprising the Fourth Wave, were to be designated on S-10 Day.

Submersible/Amphibious Tanks

Three battalions were allocated to the 16th Army and one battalion to the 9th Army. As of 29 August 1940, the four battalions, lettered A-D, totaled 160 PzKpfw III (U) submersible tanks with 37mm guns, 8 PzKpfw III (U) submersible tanks with 50mm guns, 42 PzKpfw IV (U) submersible tanks with 75mm guns, and 52 PzKpfw II (Schwimm) amphibious tanks with 20mm guns. The battalions were organized into three companies of four platoons each. **

Luftwaffe

Luftflotte 2 (cooperating with the 16th Army)

Commander-in-Chief: Generalfeldmarschall Albert Keßelring

Chief of the General Staff: Generalleutnant Wilhelm Speidel

Operations Officer (Ia): Oberstleutnant Walter Loebel

VIII. Fliegerkorps (dive-bomber aircraft): General der Flieger Dipl. Ing. Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen

II. Fliegerkorps (bomber aircraft): General der Flieger Bruno Loerzer

9. Fliegerdivision (bomber and mine laying aircraft): Generalleutnant Joachim Coeler

Jagdfliegerführer 1 (fighter aircraft): Generalmajor Theodor "Theo" Osterkamp

Jagdfliegerführer 2 (fighter aircraft): Generalmajor Kurt-Bertram von Döing

II. Flakkorps – Tasked with air defense of the English Channel coast and ports during loading and unloading of the landing craft, support of Army troops and protecting the transport fleets against air and surface attacks. This Flakkorps also controlled those Luftwaffe Flak elements attached to the corps and divisions of the 16th Army (see that Army's OOB).

Commanding General: Generalleutnant Otto Deßloch

Chief of Staff: Oberst Georg Neuffer

Flak-Regiment 6 (Ostende): Oberstleutnant Georg von Gyldenfeldt

Flak-Regiment 136 (Boulogne): Oberstleutnant Alexander Nieper

Flak-Regiment 201 (Calais): Oberstleutnant Adolf Pirmann

Flak-Regiment 202 (Dunkirk): Oberstleutnant Donald von Alten

Luftflotte 3 (cooperating with the 9th Army)

Commander-in-Chief: Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle

Chief of the General Staff: Generalmajor Günther Korten

Operations Officer (Ia): Oberstleutnant Karl Koller

I. Fliegerkorps (bomber and dive-bomber aircraft): Generaloberst Ulrich Grauert

IV. Fliegerkorps (bomber aircraft): Generalleutnant Kurt Pflugbeil

V. Fliegerkorps (bomber aircraft): General der Flieger Robert Ritter von Greim

Jagdfliegerführer 3 (fighter aircraft): Oberst Werner Junck

I. Flakkorps – Tasked with air defense of the English Channel coast and ports during loading and unloading of the landing craft, support of Army troops and protecting the transport fleets against air and surface attacks. This Flakkorps also controlled those Luftwaffe Flak elements attached to the corps and divisions of the 9th Army (see that army's OOB).

Commanding General: Generaloberst Hubert Weise

Chief of Staff: Oberst Wolfgang Pickert

Flak-Brigade I: Generalmajor Walther von Axthelm

Flak-Regiment 102: Oberstleutnant Otto Stange

Flak-Regiment 103: Oberst Alfred Kuprian

Flak-Brigade II: Oberst Erich Kressmann

Flak-Regiment 101: Oberstleutnant Johann-Wilhelm Doering-Manteuffel

Flak-Regiment 104: Oberst Hermann Lichtenberger

Kriegsmarine

Commander-in-Chief of Navy Group Command West: Generaladmiral Alfred Saalwächter (Responsible for operational direction of the "Sea Lion" light naval forces based in France and the Low Countries.)

Naval Commander West for Operation "Sea Lion" (also the Fleet Chief): Admiral Günther Lütjens (Responsible for the tactical control and protection of the four transport fleets. The Kriegsmarine began assembling the following formations for protection of the convoy routes: two destroyer flotillas at Le Havre and four torpedo boat flotillas at Cherbourg to protect the western flank and three motor torpedo boat flotillas at Zeebrügge, Flushing and Rotterdam to protect the eastern flank. Also, 27 U-boats under the direction of Vizeadmiral Karl Dönitz were arranged to reinforce the convoy protection formations. Finally, nine patrol flotillas, 10 minesweeping flotillas and five motor minesweeping flotillas would accompany the transport convoys during the actual Channel crossing. An additional three minesweeping flotillas, two anti-submarine flotillas and 14 minelayers were allocated to Navy Group Command West for supplementary support.)

Chief of Staff: Kapitän zur See Harald Netzbandt

Leader of Destroyers (also Chief of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla): Kapitän zur See Erich Bey – flagship: destroyer Hans Lody (Z 10).

Leader of Torpedo Boats: Kapitän zur See Hans Bütow

Commander of U-Boats: Vizeadmiral Karl Dönitz

Transport Fleet "B" (Dunkirk): Vizeadmiral Hermann von Fischel – transporting the first echelons of the 17th and 35th Infantry Divisions and the staff and corps troops, including Panzer Battalions B and D (less one company from the latter), of the XIII Army Corps.

Tow Formation 1 (Dunkirk): Vizeadmiral von Fischel (as well as being the transport fleet commander)

Tow Formation 2 (Ostend): Kapitän zur See Walter Hennecke

Convoy 1 (Ostend): Kapitän zur See Wagner

Convoy 2 (Rotterdam): Kapitän zur See Ernst Schirlitz

Transport Fleet "C" (Calais): Kapitän zur See Gustav Kleikamp – transporting the first echelons of the 1st Mountain Division and the 7th Infantry Division and the staff and corps troops, including Panzer Battalion A, of the VII Army Corps.

Convoy 3 (Antwerp): Kapitän zur See Wesemann

Transport Fleet "D" (Boulogne): Kapitän zur See Werner Lindenau – transporting the first echelons of the 26th and 34th Infantry Divisions and the staff and corps troops, including Panzer Battalion C, of the XXXVIII Army Corps.

Transport Fleet "E" (Le Havre): Kapitän zur See Ernst Scheurlen – transporting the first echelons of the 6th Mountain Division, the 8th and 28th Infantry Divisions and the staff and corps troops, including one company from Panzer Battalion D, of the VIII and X Army Corps.

Echelon 1a (Le Havre): Korvettenkapitän von Jagow (originally designated Convoy 4)

Echelon 1b (Le Havre): Kapitän zur See Ulrich Brocksien (originally designated Convoy 5)

Heavy Naval Units

The Kriegsmarine did not plan to employ its few remaining heavy surface units in the coastal waters of the main invasion area. Instead, they would be used for diversions to draw British naval forces away from the English Channel and tie down British troops away from the landing zones.

Two days prior to the actual landings, the light cruisers Emden (Kapitän zur See Hans Mirow), Nürnberg (Kapitän zur See Leo Kreisch with Vizeadmiral Hubert Schmundt, the Commander of Cruisers, aboard) and Köln (Kapitän zur See Ernst Kratzenberg), the gunnery training ship Bremse and other light naval forces would escort the liners Europa, Bremen, Gneisenau and Potsdam, with 11 transport steamers, on Operation "Herbstreise" (Autumn Journey), a feint simulating a landing against the English east coast between Aberdeen and Newcastle.*** After turning about, the force would attempt the diversion again on the next day if necessary. (Most of the troops allocated to the diversion would actually board the ships, but disembark before the naval force sortied.)

Shortly before the commencement of "Sea Lion," the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper (Kapitän zur See Wilhelm Meisel), on standby at Kiel from 13 September 1940, would carry out a diversionary sortie in the vicinity of Iceland and the Faroes.

The heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer (Kapitän zur See Theodor Krancke) would carry out another diversionary mission by raiding merchant shipping in the Atlantic. (It is doubtful this ship would have been available in time for the operation as she was undergoing extensive trials and crew training in the Baltic Sea following a major shipyard refit.)

The remaining German heavy surface units, the battlecruisers Scharnhorst (Kapitän zur See Kurt Caesar Hoffmann) and Gneisenau (Kapitän zur See Otto Fein), the heavy cruiser Lützow (Kapitänleutnant Heller – caretaker commander) and the light cruiser Leipzig (decommissioned) were all undergoing repairs for varying degrees of battle damage and were thus not available for Operation "Sea Lion."

In August 1940, the Kriegsmarine considered employing the pre-dreadnought battleships Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesien to provide artillery support for the landings, but ultimately rejected the idea.

SS and Police

Representative of the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Great Britain: SS Standartenführer Prof. Dr. phil. Franz Alfred Six (In a document dated 17 September 1940, SS-Gruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, the Chief of the SD Main Office, appointed Six to this post and dictated his mission: "Your task is to combat, with the requisite means, all anti-German organizations, institutions, opposition, and opposition groups which can be seized in England, to prevent the removal of all available material, and to centralize and safeguard it for future exploitation. I designate the capital, London, as the location of your headquarters as Representative of the Chief of the Security Police and SD; and I authorize you to set up small action groups [Einsatzgruppen] in other parts of Great Britain as well as the situation dictates and the necessity arises.")

NOTES

* Per Die Generale der Deutschen Luftwaffe, 1935-1945, Band 2 (Habermehl-Nuber) by Karl-Friedrich Hildebrand (Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück, Germany, 1991) Generalmajor Kieffer is listed as Koluft of the 9th Army and then Army Group A from 24 August 1939-28 February 1941. As such, it is not certain when he ceased Koluft duties with the 9th Army.

** The four panzer battalions (A, B, C, D) later formed Panzer Regiment 18 (I. & II. Abt.) and Panzer Regiment 28 (I. and II. Abt.) under the 1st Panzer Brigade, which was renamed 18th Panzer Brigade and transferred from the 1st Panzer Division to the 18th Panzer Division. Before the launch of Operation "Barbarossa" in June 1941, the Staff/Panzer Regiment 28 was disbanded while I./Panzer Regiment 28 became III./Panzer Regiment 6 (3rd Panzer Division) and II./Panzer Regiment 28 became III./Panzer Regiment 18 (18th Panzer Division).

*** Four convoys would be formed for the operation – Convoy I: the steamers Stettiner Greif, Dr. Heinrich Wiegand, and Pommern loading troops of the 69th Infantry Division at Bergen/offloading at Bekkervig, Norway; Convoy II: the steamers Steinburg, Bugsee, Ilse LM Russ, and Flottbeck loading troops of the 214th Infantry Division at Stavanger/offloading at Haugesund, Norway; Convoy III: the steamers Iller, Sabine, Howaldt, and Lumme loading troops of the 214th Infantry Division at Arendal/offloading at Kristiansand, Norway; Convoy IV: the liners Europa and Bremen simulating loading troops at Wesermünde and the liners Gneisenau and Potsdam loading troops at Hamburg/offloading at Cuxhaven.