View Full Version : community help! rare photos request

05-08-2006, 03:08 PM
can anyone kindly post some german beach landing photos on N.Africa or something,I think these are not well documented events http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_frown.gif

TY http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

05-08-2006, 03:08 PM
can anyone kindly post some german beach landing photos on N.Africa or something,I think these are not well documented events http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_frown.gif

TY http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

05-08-2006, 03:47 PM
I don't think the Germans did any beach landings in N. Africa. They were transported in ships which disembarked in harbours.

I could be wrong though.

05-08-2006, 03:59 PM
Don't think German troops ever undertook any sizeable amphibious landings in North Africa. Before the fall of Libya all materials and supplies for the Afrika Korps were shipped through Tripoli harbour, AFAIK.


05-08-2006, 04:01 PM

05-08-2006, 05:23 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-title">quote:</div><div class="ip-ubbcode-quote-content">Originally posted by sokil:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:PanzerIII%28Afrika%29.jpg </div></BLOCKQUOTE>

Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf G with the short 50 http://forums.ubi.com/groupee_common/emoticons/icon_smile.gif

Mainstay of the Afrika Corp though no-one seems to have heard much about them these days.

05-08-2006, 11:46 PM
if the german amphibious ops on UK commenced,will they have any landing craft similar to those used by the americans?
its weird for german troops to storm the beach.

05-08-2006, 11:59 PM
There were a great many landing boats being prepared in the french and dutch german ports, but the RAF and FAA kept bombing them, and the plans for Sealion kept getting held back, and then were finally put on hold indefinately.

I've never seen any photos of these botas, however, but I'm sure there's some around here somewhere.

05-09-2006, 12:55 AM
I think I can help.

From Operation Sea Lion by Peter Fleming pages 242-245.

The chief burden of the preparations fell upon the Navy, who now began, with more diligence than enthusiasm, to requisition a heterogeneous armada. The economic dislocation which these measures caused throughout Germany and Occupied Europe was one of the stock arguments which Raeder used in his untiring, but cautious, efforts to have Sea Lion shelved. His staff estimated the shipping requirements of the invading force, even after it had been sharply reduced in size, as follows:

155 transports
1,722 barges
471 tugs

On 26 July he was describing to the Fuehrer "forcefully once again" the damage which would be inflicted on the German economy by the diversion of these resources.
The barges were mostly canal barges, with a loading capacity of 500-800 tons and a draught of six feet, but some river barges, with a capacity of 1,300 tons, were also impressed. Very few were self-propelled, and the indispensable tugs (of which in the end only 386 were got together) were a highly vulnerable part of the whole enterprise. The owners of the barges, of whom more than half were Dutch and Belgian and several hundred French, received compensation at a not ungenerous daily rate based on tonnage and for powered craft on horsepower. When Sea Lion was finally cancelled, most of the barges were retained by the military authorities which had been worth paying for the sinews of a swift victory, was seen, now that the barges were required not for weeks but for years, to be in need of revision, and in September the rates were much reduced. The barges were adapted for their role as assault craft by removing the bows and replacing them with collapsible ramps which would act both as sally ports and as gangways for men and vehicles; they were also given concrete floors, so that they could carry tanks, guns and motor vehicles. Neither expedient increased their seaworthiness or their maneuverability, which were in any case€"since they were designed only to navigate inland waterways€"extremely limited even before conversion. Some of the largest barges, instead of being towed, were to be pushed across the Channel by a pair of small minesweepers lashed on either side of their stern; it is doubtful if these improvised ferries, which had a maximum speed of four knots, could have reached their objectives, or even completed the crossing at all, save in a dead calm, yet they were to carry, in an early wave of the assault, men of two elite divisions of the Waffen SS.

To a race of landsmen the manning of this remarkable fleet (whose role, it must be remembered, was not to make one reckless descent on England in favorable weather but to cross and recross the Channel continuously for several weeks under conditions which were bound to deteriorate) presented considerable problems. Appeals for men with experience of waterman ship resulted in a certain number volunteering or being drafted; but often only very tenuous qualifications (such as a taste for canoeing) fitted these recruits for their new duties, and the placid bargees were sea-dogs by comparison.

But it would be wrong to underrate the drive and resourcefulness with which, in a matter of weeks and starting from scratch, the Germans equipped and assembled the craft they needed; it was a prodigious feat of organization. In it they were greatly helped by their control of huge labor reserves in the subjugated countries. This is a factor which ought not to be ignored in comparing the respective positions of Germany and Britain in the summer of 1940, for it further weighted the balance of strength in Germany's favor. Everything the British did in preparing their defenses they had to do for themselves; they filled their own sandbags, dug their own trenches, drove their own trains, cleared up their own bomb-damage. On the other side of the Channel the Germans could get these and many other things done for them, and French, Dutch and Belgian workmen and officials were perforce harnessed, directly or indirectly, to the task of preparing invasion.

On 19 July, three days after he had received Directive No. 16, Raeder submitted to the Fuehrer a long memorandum setting forth the difficulties inherent in the operation and the dangers to be feared from weather, mines, the British land-defenses, the lack of artillery support, and above all from the Royal Navy, which he expected to be committed "fully and decisively", which the Luftwaffe would not be able to deal with, and which, even if the first wave got ashore, might well be able to cut it off from seaward.

On the 21st he had an interview with Hitler, who was still talking in terms of 40 divisions and the €œmain operation€ being €œcompleted" by 15 September. Hitler conceded however that "the invasion of Britain is an especially daring undertaking, because even if the way is short, this is not just a river-crossing, but die crossing of a sea which is dominated by die enemy". He had perhaps begun to suspect that die German Navy's responsibilities were not limited to "doing the work of the engineers" in a river-crossing operation. If Raedcr made any comments, he did not record them.

By now OKW had come round to the idea that Sea Lion€"in which they had not so far taken, and indeed never did take, an executive part of any consequence€"was a capital scheme; and OKH were looking forward to "a war of movement on the Island". On 29 June the Navy were given an outline of OKH's requirements: 13 divisions (about 260,000 men) to be landed at dawn between Ramsgatc and Lyme Bay and to be followed€"in less than the ten days which the Navy considered feasible€"by a second wave of unspecified strength. This began a long controversy, the Army adhering to its demands for a wide front, the Navy insisting than a narrow front was operationally essential as far as they were concerned.

On 31 July€"with D-day still, on paper, only 15 days away€" Raeder was summoned to another conference with Hitler. Besides those military waxworks from OKW, Kcitel and Jodl,' OKH were represented by von Brauchitsch and Halder. Raeder, whose attitude to Sea Lion was not in the current vogue, began by reporting that €œall preparations were in full swing€ but that 15 September was the earliest possible date on which the operation could be launched. He took the opportunity of delivering a short lecture on the influence of tides, weather and darkness on amphibious operations.

The singular composition of the transport fleet [he said] will make it very difficult to carry out the assault in total darkness, i.e. with no moon. Large numbers of slow, unwieldy transport units concentrated in a small space, mixed with motor-boats of the most varied types, and escorted by light units of the Navy and auxiliary vessels, make it necessary to have a certain amount of light for navigational reasons.

Ostensibly Raeder was talking about the dangers of darkness; in fact he was trying, as openly as he dared, to make the soldiers realize that Sea Lion was out of the question with the available naval and shipping resources.


In short they never did a beach landing in landing craft. Therefore the pics are rare.