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tagert
02-04-2004, 10:25 PM
The original post of Guido Mutk's high speed dive in a Me262 can be seen here

http://mach1.luftarchiv.de/first_flg.htm

Starting with that, I have removed all of Guido Mutk's analogs, references to, and comparisons to:

-Yegar's flight
-Prop limitations
-Elevator Trim
-Finger through a candle flame

My goal was to make it a continuos account of the event. In the hopes of removing any intentional or un-intentional confusion. What follows is my cut-n-paste of his account in 3 sections

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR> section 1: Guido Mutke describes his high speed dive:
In an anempt to assist my comrade Achammer and to attack the Mustang, I immediately interrupted my flight with a steep wing-over to the left into a 40? dive and applied full power in order to reach the Mustang as quickly as possible. At this altitude of 12.000 m (36.000 ft) the aircraft began within a few seconds to vibrate, followed closely by a very strong buffeting which caused the tail to swing from side to side and the whole aircraft to oscillate due to the pressure waves. The airspeed indicator was against the stop at 1.100 km/h (682 rnph), the aircraft was no longer controllable and was vibrating so violently that it was not possible to read the instruments. A second later there was no longer any feeling of an aircraft through the stick which stayed in whatever position it was placed. Immediately following this the aircraft was suddenly again controllable although the altitude-compensated airspeed indicator remained on the stop at 1.100 krn/h (682 mph). At the start of this phase the aircraft pitched sharply into a nose-down attitude which could not be corrected by use of the controls; on the contrary the nose-down attitude continued to increase despite all my efforts. During these critical seconds I also attempted to yaw the aircraft across the direction of flight by alternate application of full left and full right rudder; however this also had no effect.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR> section 2: Guido Mutke describes his high speed dive (continued):
In the meantime I had closed the throttles and experienced a flame-out on both engines. However, after recovering the attitude of the aircraft and reducing the extreme speed it was possible to re-light both engines. I then realised that I was no longer able to control the aircraft normally since it had a tendency to veer to the right and to enter a climb, without any movernent of the stick. After reducing the speed to 500 kmlh (310 mph) it was dear that I would experience considerable difficulty during the landing<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR> section 3: Guido Mutke describes the condition of the Me262 post high speed dive:
After landing, the badly damaged aircraft was inspected by Oberstleutnant B¤r, who found that the wings were distorted and a number of rivets were missing, and surmised that the aircraft must have exceeded 950 km/h (589 mph). I naturally had to reject this suggestion because damaging such a rare and precious aircraft as the Me262 would result in a severe punishment and after such a lucky end to the flight I naturally didn't want to end up in prison. In reply to his continual questions as to what had happened to the aircraft I could only answer, rather naively, that it must be a "Monday Production" aircraft since these defects had occurred so suddenly during the flight that it could only have been the result of faulty construction<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Guido Mutke contends that the indication of breaking the sound barrier is the regaining of flight controls once the aircraft has broken the sound barrier.

I have summarized Guido Mutke's sound barrier braking sequence

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>from section 1 (summary)
1) aircraft began within a few seconds to vibrate
2) followed closely by a very strong buffeting
3) the aircraft was no longer controllable
4) A second later there was no longer any feeling of an aircraft through the stick
5) Immediately following this the aircraft was suddenly again controllable<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think he purposely broke up his account with all those analogy to try and relate his experience to Yeager and others.. but in doing so one thing that is not clear is when he experienced a flame out. i.e.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>from section 2:
In the meantime I had closed the throttles and experienced a flame-out on both engines
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But later the document goes on to say

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>from web sight
The main characteristics of crossing the sound barrier in such an aircraft can be summarized as:
-Firstly extreme buffeting and vibration
-Followed by a short period in which the control surfaces are totally ineffective
-The flame-out of the engines
-After passing the barrier, normal control is restored.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

So, are we to belive that AFTER THE ENGINES FLAMED-OUT the aircraft continued to GAIN SPEED and go onto break the sound barrier.. At which point he notes that normal control is restored. Is that what we are to belive?

The fact is that regaining control of the aircraft DOES NOT indicate the aircraft itself exceeded the speed of sound.. What it does indicate is that the air in and around the control surfaces exceeded the speed of sound.

I find it hard to belive they could make such an error, in light of the fact that very web page uses the Me 262 A-1 Pilot's Handbook" issued by Headquarters Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio as Report No. F-SU-1111-ND on 10 January 1946 As a source.

This pilot's hand book clearly describes the same thing that loss of, followed by the regaining of contorl along with the speed at which it happens.. Which is less than the speed of sound.

Therefore, Guido Mutke's proof is not proof at all, in that the loss followed by regaining of control happens PRIOR TO THE SPEED OF SOUND!!

The only difference between Guido Mutke's account and the F-SU-1111-ND Pilots Handbook account is Guido Mutke experienced a flame out.. and damaged the Me262 wings.. Now one might think the damage is due to breaking the sound barrier.. but if you belive that.. then you will have to belive the Me262 went on to break the sound barrier AFTER THE ENGINES FLAMED OUT!! I do agree with Guido Mutke on one thing.. His original statement to the ground chief about the damage.. that it must be a "Monday Production" aircraft Which would be a better explanation as to why Guido Mutke's Me262 was damaged and the captured Me262 flown at Wright Field was not.

TAGERT

[This message was edited by tagert on Thu February 05 2004 at 06:32 AM.]

tagert
02-04-2004, 10:25 PM
The original post of Guido Mutk's high speed dive in a Me262 can be seen here

http://mach1.luftarchiv.de/first_flg.htm

Starting with that, I have removed all of Guido Mutk's analogs, references to, and comparisons to:

-Yegar's flight
-Prop limitations
-Elevator Trim
-Finger through a candle flame

My goal was to make it a continuos account of the event. In the hopes of removing any intentional or un-intentional confusion. What follows is my cut-n-paste of his account in 3 sections

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR> section 1: Guido Mutke describes his high speed dive:
In an anempt to assist my comrade Achammer and to attack the Mustang, I immediately interrupted my flight with a steep wing-over to the left into a 40? dive and applied full power in order to reach the Mustang as quickly as possible. At this altitude of 12.000 m (36.000 ft) the aircraft began within a few seconds to vibrate, followed closely by a very strong buffeting which caused the tail to swing from side to side and the whole aircraft to oscillate due to the pressure waves. The airspeed indicator was against the stop at 1.100 km/h (682 rnph), the aircraft was no longer controllable and was vibrating so violently that it was not possible to read the instruments. A second later there was no longer any feeling of an aircraft through the stick which stayed in whatever position it was placed. Immediately following this the aircraft was suddenly again controllable although the altitude-compensated airspeed indicator remained on the stop at 1.100 krn/h (682 mph). At the start of this phase the aircraft pitched sharply into a nose-down attitude which could not be corrected by use of the controls; on the contrary the nose-down attitude continued to increase despite all my efforts. During these critical seconds I also attempted to yaw the aircraft across the direction of flight by alternate application of full left and full right rudder; however this also had no effect.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR> section 2: Guido Mutke describes his high speed dive (continued):
In the meantime I had closed the throttles and experienced a flame-out on both engines. However, after recovering the attitude of the aircraft and reducing the extreme speed it was possible to re-light both engines. I then realised that I was no longer able to control the aircraft normally since it had a tendency to veer to the right and to enter a climb, without any movernent of the stick. After reducing the speed to 500 kmlh (310 mph) it was dear that I would experience considerable difficulty during the landing<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR> section 3: Guido Mutke describes the condition of the Me262 post high speed dive:
After landing, the badly damaged aircraft was inspected by Oberstleutnant B¤r, who found that the wings were distorted and a number of rivets were missing, and surmised that the aircraft must have exceeded 950 km/h (589 mph). I naturally had to reject this suggestion because damaging such a rare and precious aircraft as the Me262 would result in a severe punishment and after such a lucky end to the flight I naturally didn't want to end up in prison. In reply to his continual questions as to what had happened to the aircraft I could only answer, rather naively, that it must be a "Monday Production" aircraft since these defects had occurred so suddenly during the flight that it could only have been the result of faulty construction<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Guido Mutke contends that the indication of breaking the sound barrier is the regaining of flight controls once the aircraft has broken the sound barrier.

I have summarized Guido Mutke's sound barrier braking sequence

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>from section 1 (summary)
1) aircraft began within a few seconds to vibrate
2) followed closely by a very strong buffeting
3) the aircraft was no longer controllable
4) A second later there was no longer any feeling of an aircraft through the stick
5) Immediately following this the aircraft was suddenly again controllable<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think he purposely broke up his account with all those analogy to try and relate his experience to Yeager and others.. but in doing so one thing that is not clear is when he experienced a flame out. i.e.

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>from section 2:
In the meantime I had closed the throttles and experienced a flame-out on both engines
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But later the document goes on to say

<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>from web sight
The main characteristics of crossing the sound barrier in such an aircraft can be summarized as:
-Firstly extreme buffeting and vibration
-Followed by a short period in which the control surfaces are totally ineffective
-The flame-out of the engines
-After passing the barrier, normal control is restored.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

So, are we to belive that AFTER THE ENGINES FLAMED-OUT the aircraft continued to GAIN SPEED and go onto break the sound barrier.. At which point he notes that normal control is restored. Is that what we are to belive?

The fact is that regaining control of the aircraft DOES NOT indicate the aircraft itself exceeded the speed of sound.. What it does indicate is that the air in and around the control surfaces exceeded the speed of sound.

I find it hard to belive they could make such an error, in light of the fact that very web page uses the Me 262 A-1 Pilot's Handbook" issued by Headquarters Air Materiel Command, Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio as Report No. F-SU-1111-ND on 10 January 1946 As a source.

This pilot's hand book clearly describes the same thing that loss of, followed by the regaining of contorl along with the speed at which it happens.. Which is less than the speed of sound.

Therefore, Guido Mutke's proof is not proof at all, in that the loss followed by regaining of control happens PRIOR TO THE SPEED OF SOUND!!

The only difference between Guido Mutke's account and the F-SU-1111-ND Pilots Handbook account is Guido Mutke experienced a flame out.. and damaged the Me262 wings.. Now one might think the damage is due to breaking the sound barrier.. but if you belive that.. then you will have to belive the Me262 went on to break the sound barrier AFTER THE ENGINES FLAMED OUT!! I do agree with Guido Mutke on one thing.. His original statement to the ground chief about the damage.. that it must be a "Monday Production" aircraft Which would be a better explanation as to why Guido Mutke's Me262 was damaged and the captured Me262 flown at Wright Field was not.

TAGERT

[This message was edited by tagert on Thu February 05 2004 at 06:32 AM.]