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Teddy Bar
07-24-2004, 07:52 PM
The Germans were never able to put enough u-boats to sea. In June 1940 of the fifty one available u-boats (SIX less than September 1939) only eighteen u-boats were on the frontline, in early 1941 of the available 109 u-boats only an average of 27 boats were in the front line at anytime.

To give a brief breakdown of the available u-boats, verses front line boats verses frontline boats at sea From Sept 39 to July 42β...The last figure is obviously the most important.
Sept 39
57 – 39 - 23
Oct 39
51 – 39 - 10
Nov 39
52 – 33 - 16
Dec 39
54 – 34 - 8

Jan 40
54 – 33 - 11
Feb 40
50 – 35 - 15
Mar 40
50 – 34 - 13
April 40
47 – 34 - 24
May 40
49 – 31 - 8
June 40
51 – 27 - 18
July 40
53 – 30 - 11
Aug 40
55 – 27 - 13
Sept 40
61 – 27 - 13
Oct 40
68 – 30 - 12
Nov 40
74 – 24 - 11
Dec 40
83 – 27 - 10
Jan 41
94 – 22 - 8
Feb 41
103 – 21 - 12
Mar 41
109 – 27 – 13
April 41
121 – 28 -19
May 41
139 – 33 – 24
June 41
150 – 38 - 32
July 41
169 – 53 - 27
Aug 41
184 – 64 - 36
Sept 41
197 – 73 - 36
Oct 41
219 – 75 - 36
Nov 41
238 – 81 - 38
Dec 41
250 – 88 - 25

Jan 42
262 – 91 - 42
Feb 42
276 – 101 - 50
March 42
288 – 111 - 48
April 42
302 – 119 - 49
May 42
318 – 124 - 61
June 42
336 – 126 59
July 42
346 – 138 - 70



Whilst the u-boat was a far beyond anything the allies had and initially until the capture of U-110 thought was possible regarding the depth in which it could dive, Germany (Donitz?) failed to develop the u-boat and counter measures and the torpedo.

The Germans also had torpedo issues that resulted in missed opportunities. The issues were to do with maintaining the correct depth (up to 5.75 feet, or nearly 2 metres), premature detonation from the magnetic pistol and an unreliable impact mechanism. It would take 2.5 years to resolve these issues.

From Sept 39 to March 41 it is estimated that 25% of all torpedoes failed Donitz is quoted as saying that in this 6 month period the defective torpedoes robbed the u-boats of approximately 300,000 tons of shipping.

As an example, in the Norwegian campaign of the attacks against allied warships it was deduced from Commanderβ's reports and firing solutions that a successful attack would have been achievedβ...
In one of the four attacks against battleships
In seven of the twelve attacks against cruisers
In seven of the ten attacks against destroyers
In five out of five attacks against transports

In high seas a depth setting above 13 feets, or 3+ metres was not possible. So many targets could not be attacked, especially escorts.

In mid 1942, an analysis of the ships sunk to torpedoes hits of torpedo using the impact fuse (as the magnetic fuse had not yet been resolved) showed that it took 806 hits to sink 404 ships, or two torpedo hits per sinking. Had a magnetic pistol been in use, it would have been closer to a 1 to 1 ratio. It was not until November 1942 did the Pi2 magnetic pistol be come operationally available.

At the same time as the new magnetic pistol was available the G7a FAT torpedo come into service. This torpedo ziged/zaged after a predetermined distance and raised the number of hits against convoys up to 75% (I do not have the previous percentage ratio).



The allies nullified the u-boat war with...
Superior technology such as radar, ship borne HUFF/DUFF, the 'Q' & 'Type 147 Sword' sonar
Superior code cracking helped by poor leadership by the relevant German departments in having their heads stuck in the sand
America's massive industrial resources which supplied the planes & escorts to fight the u-boat offensive

Cheers,

Teddy BΓΒ€r

Teddy Bar
07-24-2004, 07:52 PM
The Germans were never able to put enough u-boats to sea. In June 1940 of the fifty one available u-boats (SIX less than September 1939) only eighteen u-boats were on the frontline, in early 1941 of the available 109 u-boats only an average of 27 boats were in the front line at anytime.

To give a brief breakdown of the available u-boats, verses front line boats verses frontline boats at sea From Sept 39 to July 42β...The last figure is obviously the most important.
Sept 39
57 – 39 - 23
Oct 39
51 – 39 - 10
Nov 39
52 – 33 - 16
Dec 39
54 – 34 - 8

Jan 40
54 – 33 - 11
Feb 40
50 – 35 - 15
Mar 40
50 – 34 - 13
April 40
47 – 34 - 24
May 40
49 – 31 - 8
June 40
51 – 27 - 18
July 40
53 – 30 - 11
Aug 40
55 – 27 - 13
Sept 40
61 – 27 - 13
Oct 40
68 – 30 - 12
Nov 40
74 – 24 - 11
Dec 40
83 – 27 - 10
Jan 41
94 – 22 - 8
Feb 41
103 – 21 - 12
Mar 41
109 – 27 – 13
April 41
121 – 28 -19
May 41
139 – 33 – 24
June 41
150 – 38 - 32
July 41
169 – 53 - 27
Aug 41
184 – 64 - 36
Sept 41
197 – 73 - 36
Oct 41
219 – 75 - 36
Nov 41
238 – 81 - 38
Dec 41
250 – 88 - 25

Jan 42
262 – 91 - 42
Feb 42
276 – 101 - 50
March 42
288 – 111 - 48
April 42
302 – 119 - 49
May 42
318 – 124 - 61
June 42
336 – 126 59
July 42
346 – 138 - 70



Whilst the u-boat was a far beyond anything the allies had and initially until the capture of U-110 thought was possible regarding the depth in which it could dive, Germany (Donitz?) failed to develop the u-boat and counter measures and the torpedo.

The Germans also had torpedo issues that resulted in missed opportunities. The issues were to do with maintaining the correct depth (up to 5.75 feet, or nearly 2 metres), premature detonation from the magnetic pistol and an unreliable impact mechanism. It would take 2.5 years to resolve these issues.

From Sept 39 to March 41 it is estimated that 25% of all torpedoes failed Donitz is quoted as saying that in this 6 month period the defective torpedoes robbed the u-boats of approximately 300,000 tons of shipping.

As an example, in the Norwegian campaign of the attacks against allied warships it was deduced from Commanderβ's reports and firing solutions that a successful attack would have been achievedβ...
In one of the four attacks against battleships
In seven of the twelve attacks against cruisers
In seven of the ten attacks against destroyers
In five out of five attacks against transports

In high seas a depth setting above 13 feets, or 3+ metres was not possible. So many targets could not be attacked, especially escorts.

In mid 1942, an analysis of the ships sunk to torpedoes hits of torpedo using the impact fuse (as the magnetic fuse had not yet been resolved) showed that it took 806 hits to sink 404 ships, or two torpedo hits per sinking. Had a magnetic pistol been in use, it would have been closer to a 1 to 1 ratio. It was not until November 1942 did the Pi2 magnetic pistol be come operationally available.

At the same time as the new magnetic pistol was available the G7a FAT torpedo come into service. This torpedo ziged/zaged after a predetermined distance and raised the number of hits against convoys up to 75% (I do not have the previous percentage ratio).



The allies nullified the u-boat war with...
Superior technology such as radar, ship borne HUFF/DUFF, the 'Q' & 'Type 147 Sword' sonar
Superior code cracking helped by poor leadership by the relevant German departments in having their heads stuck in the sand
America's massive industrial resources which supplied the planes & escorts to fight the u-boat offensive

Cheers,

Teddy BΓΒ€r

sdcruz
07-26-2004, 03:45 AM
Hitler didnt believe in winning the war at sea - he was a land man and even though Donitz pressed him for more resources for the U Boat effort, Hitler ignored him.

bertgang
07-26-2004, 04:39 AM
Add high expenses for the quite useless surface fleet, and the wrong hope for an armistice with GB after France falls.

macker33
07-26-2004, 10:04 PM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Bertgang:
Add high expenses for the quite useless surface fleet, and the wrong hope for an armistice with GB after France falls.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hitler probably thought all english polititions were like chamberlin.

HansN-u768
07-27-2004, 02:35 AM
TO think they said Radar wont make a difrent aaaggghhh http://ubbxforums.ubi.com/images/smiley/35.gif think on it german subs with radar in 1941 whhhaaa ... well hitler wantet V rockets (Nuki Nuki ) and he wantet PANZER !!! BUT well german did do a Good job on the Torps..

-=)Silent as a Stone(=-

der|zerst0rer|
07-27-2004, 04:25 AM
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>Hitler didnt believe in winning the war at sea - he was a land man and even though Donitz pressed him for more resources for the U Boat effort, Hitler ignored him.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Did Hitler ever listen to advice from well experienced much-better-knowing officers in any aspect of the war? No, he held the fanatics closest because they provided false, often unreachable visions of an utopia outcome of WWII http://ubbxforums.ubi.com/infopop/emoticons/icon_rolleyes.gif

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"Victim is your name, and you shall fall"